Anti-Rafale Campaign:
Press Stoops to Abysmal Depths
Major General Mrinal Suman
For the evolution of
healthy democratic practices, it is essential that the opposition keeps the
government on its toes through unrelenting questioning of the policies and
performance. However, such criticism should be objective and based on truth.
False accusations invariably backfire and show the critics as unscruplous and
untrustworthy entities. They lose their credibility and the public starts
considering them to be ‘moles and plants’ of adversarial interests. Such a
development does immense damage to the body politic and psyche of the nation.
Two recent incidents are recalled here.
Alleged Waiver of
Anti-Corruption Clauses in the Rafale Deal
Headlines of a
newspaper dated 11 Feb 2019 screamed that the government made unprecedented
concessions with regard to critical provisions for anti-corruption penalties
and making payments through an escrow account in the Inter Government Agreement
(IGA) signed between India and France on 23 September 2016.
The paper claims
that the provisions of the Defence Procurement Procedure-2013 (DPP) were
violated by not adhering to the mandatory Standard Contract Document, given at
Chapter V of the procedure. It goes on to accuse the government of dropping clauses
on “Penalty for use of Undue Influence, Agents/Agency Commission, and Access to
Company Accounts” in the Supply Protocols which form part of the Standard
Contract Document.
One does not know
whether to pity the said newspaper for its sheer ignorance of the procedure or
to slam it for malicious and unethical reporting. The paper has most
dishonestly omitted to inform the readers that the Standard Contract Document
is not applicable to IGA. It is yellow journalism and scandal-mongering at their
worst.
Para 60 of DPP unambiguously states, “The Standard Contract
Document at Chapter V indicates the general conditions of contract that would
be the guideline for all acquisitions.... However, for single vendor
procurements, if there is a situation where Govt of India has entered into
agreements with that vendor/country regarding specific contractual clauses,
then the terms and conditions of such agreements would supersede the
corresponding standard clauses of DPP 2013.”
Para 71 of DPP specifically refers to procurement proposals
under IGA. It reads, “There may be occasions when procurements would have to be
done from friendly foreign countries which may be necessitated due to
geo-strategic advantages that are likely to accrue to our country. Such procurements would not classically
follow the Standard Procurement Procedure and the Standard Contract Document
but would be based on mutually agreed provisions by the Governments of both the
countries.”
It needs to be
recalled here that India has been buying defence equipment on government to
government basis from Russia for decades. Similarly, starting with the purchase
of AN/TPQ-37 Fire Finder counter-battery
artillery radar sets in 2002, India has signed many major deals with the US government. No IGA has followed the Standard Contract Document and
the agreements do not contain any so-called anti-corruption clauses. The foreign
governments consider it an affront. They resent Indian government trying to
occupy the high moral ground of being the paragon of honesty and treating other
parties as devious connivers who need to be kept under the leash of
anti-corruption clauses.
IGA is a solemn commitment between the two
sovereigns, based on mutual trust. The very idea of one government asking the
other to give undertaking on integrity issues is an anathema to international relations.
Similarly, the point raised about sovereign guarantee is totally misplaced. No
country gives that. It must be appreciated that the French government went out
of its way to give a letter of comfort to satisfy Indian sceptics.
The Case of the Infamous
Note
A note initiated by
Dy Secy (Air II) on 24 November 2015 has been published by the said paper to
claim that PMO’s Office had been having parallel parlays on the Rafale deal.
The note throws up many disturbing issues.
Why did Dy Secy (Air
II), who had nothing to do with the Rafale deal initiate such a note? As shown
in the organisation tree below, there are three well-defined verticals in the Department
of Defence of the Defence Ministry, each under an Additional Secretary level
officer.
Addl Secy-I deals
with revenue expenditure and routine administrative matters of the three
services. He has nothing whatsoever to do with capital procurements, not even
remotely. Dy Secy (Air II) comes under JS (Air). His channel of reporting is
through JS (Air) and Addl Secy-I. Indian bureaucracu is notorious for guarding
its turf aggressively and brooks no interference from intruders. Why was Dy
Secy (Air II) allowed to meddle in capital procurements?
The Acquisition Wing
under DG Acq is the executive arm of the Defence Acquisition Council and is
responsible for the acquisition of new weaponry and defence systems. Contract
Negotiating Committee (CNC) is constituted under the aegis of DG Acq. As per
Appendix B of DPP-2013, the standard composition of CNC consists of Acquisition
Manager, Technical Manager, Finance Manager, Advisor (Cost), Quality Control
Officer, User Representative, Repair
Agency Representative and Representative of Contract Management Branch at the
Service Headquarters. Most members are of Jt Secy level. There is no
representative of Addl Secy-I.
Normally,
Acquisition Manager heads CNC. However, DG Acqn may nominate a service officer
to head CNC with the approval of the Defence Minister. In the case of the
Rafale deal, Air Marshal SPB Sinha, an officer with outstanding credentials and
impeccable probity record was hand picked to head CNC. The country could not
have selected a more suitable officer.
The question arises
as to what prompted Dy Secy (Air II), a much too junior an officer, to meddle
in the matters that did not concern him at all? Was it done at someone’s
behest? Was it a part of a well-orchestrated campaign to derail the Rafale
deal?
Further, why did Dy
Secy (Air II) not follow the laid-down chain of correspondence? Why did he
bypass his own Jt Secy and Addl Secy-I to address the note directly to the Jt
Secy of the Acqn Wing with whom he had no dealings whatsoever?
More importantly, why
did the Acq Manager, DG Acquisition and Def Secy not question Dy Secy (Air II)
for his locus standi in the matter? Was this issue beyond the competence of
these bureaucrats or were they a party to the malicious plot or did they lack
courage to tick him off for interfering in matters that did not concern him. Instead
they took serious cognizance of the note.
Surprisingly, quite unlike the functioning of
the lethargic Indian bureaucracy, the note moved with abnormal speed. Jt Secy of
the Acqn Wing and DG Acqn saw the note on the day it was initiated, i.e 24 November
2015. What was the hurry? Was any higher-up overseeing and expediting the move
of the file?
Perhaps the most
strange aspect of the whole affair is the fact that a junior officer in MoD
could have the audicity to fault the functioning of PMO’s office and accusing
it of weakening the negotiating position of MoD. India bureaucracy is notorious
for its spinelessness and sycophancy. No junior officer will ever dare to use
such harsh language for PMO’s office. Something is certainly amiss.
Finally
It is apparent even to the laypersons that a
deliberate and concerted campaign is being carried out to tarnish the image of
the government and to prevent it from placing repeat orders on Dassault. The
schemers pretend to smell a rat where none exist. In fact, they are attempting
to plant a rat to discredit the Rafale deal. It becomes worse
when a reputed media house is seen as an unprincipled, unethical and villainous
rogue, masquerading as a champion of probity in public affairs.
It must be conceded that in a major procurement
of this nature, all officials involved tend to offer their considered opinion
and advice to make the deal rock solid. It is their duty and they are fully
justified to suggest various safeguards. The final decision making powers lie
in the hands of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). It is for CCS and other
empowered entities to weigh all suggestions and take the final call.
India bureaucracy is like a quagmire. Every
bureaucrat has mastered the art of playing safe by putting up incongruous and infructuous
notings on files that can stall the process for ever. If the decision makers get
cowed down, no proposal will ever fructify. As the Rafale deal shows, only a
strong leader like Modi could have overcome the impediments created by the
vested interests and the grossly spineless bureaucracy.
To criticise and fault the government
is fully justified provided the facts support allegations. It is grossly unfair
to invent wild allegations, in the hope that some accusations may stick. There has been no trail or even a
hint of any sleaze money in the Rafale deal so far. There were no middlemen or
agents. In fact, it should be considered a master stroke by the Indian
government to make up critical deficiencies of the Air Force in an expeditious,
diligent and far-sighted manner.*****
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