Redeeming the Standing of the Army

Redeeming the Standing of the Army

Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM, PhD

Every survey carried out by different agencies shows the military at the top of peoples’ choice for probity, loyalty and selflessness. Indian army, unlike other organisations, is held in high esteem and as a paragon of best societal norms. Citizens have put soldiers on a pedestal and feel let down whenever cases of their unbecoming conduct are reported. Even minor aberrations carry considerable shock effect. That is the reason why amassing of illegal wealth by a bureaucrat couple does not stir public’s conscience while a Chief’s seeking allotment of a plot is considered a questionable act. These are the consequences an organisation has to suffer due to the high expectancy quotient that it enjoys.

Although every organisation strives to have a respectable standing, need for recognition in an army’s case becomes all the more critical as soldiers draw strength from the admiration and acknowledgement that they receive from their countrymen. Soldiers are always very sensitive to negative portrayal as it threatens the very edifice of their sense of military honour from which they draw their sustenance. The manner in which a nation perceives its soldiers has a profound influence on the morale and psyche of the soldiers.

Unfortunately, of late Indian army is losing its exalted status. It has been in news for all negative reasons in the recent years – both true and perceived. Its standing has taken a hit. Earlier, ‘olive green’ was always associated with uprightness, honour and ethical conduct. Various acts of commission and omission during the last decade have impinged on its sheen and the people have started wondering if the army is really ‘different’. The indicators are there for all to see. Reputation once lost cannot be regained easily. Therefore, it is time the army acts on a war footing, lest the situation drifts beyond easy redemption.

It must be stated at the outset that public’s respect can only be earned through unblemished behaviour and upright conduct. These are irreplaceable requirements of fundamental importance. Therefore, Indian army must strengthen its internal self-correcting mechanism to prevent incidence of acts of misdemeanor. While putting its house in order, the army should simultaneously undertake a well-evolved campaign to regain its waning standing.

The suggested campaign should not be based on management of media through questionable means and suppressing the truth. That shall be a very shortsighted and counterproductive policy. Paid-for publicity and planted write-ups lack legitimacy and credibility. They may be valid means for building brand image by corporate entities but equation between the army and the citizens is based on trust, honour and commitment. It cannot be brought down to the mundane levels of seller-buyer relationship. Therefore, the army should aim at establishing rapport with the public through transparent interaction, honest admission of mistakes and prompt corrective action to prevent recurrence. Four key contours of the suggested campaign have been discussed below.

Innovative and Pro-Active Public-Relations Drive

Mistakenly, public-relations is often taken to mean publicity. Public-relations for an army is an all encompassing reflective paradigm with the aim of building understanding with countrymen and retaining their goodwill. Through a well conceived public-relations exercise, misconceptions and prejudices entertained by some segments of the society can also be removed. On the other hand, publicity confines itself with spreading awareness to build favourable impression which may be based on facts or unsubstantiated claims.

Unfortunately, the army brass has failed to comprehend the intricacies of effective public-relations and factors that influence public opinion and attitude. Being a highly specialised and multi-faceted activity, public-relations must be handled by specially trained personnel. Help of external experts and agencies should also be taken. They are of immense value in crisis situations when speedy transmission of accurate and authentic information to right quarters can help clarify doubts, remove uncertainty and help contain damage to reputation. Media professionals who have better understanding of the defence services can be used to help bridge the gap between the services and the public.

Regular Organisational Communication

An organisational communication is issued to spread awareness both amongst its own members as also the general public. Its potency depends on the credibility it enjoys for honest, transparent and ethical reporting of facts, both favourable and unfavourable. It can be in the form of periodic newsletters, press releases or press briefings. However, such communication must be managed by specialists well conversed with various aspects of environmental interfacing.

With an explosion of 24X7 news media, every channel strives to be the first to ‘break the news’. They are even ready to compromise on fact finding. If the army does not disseminate information speedily, the media will simply go to ill-informed or unreliable sources. Therefore, it is imperative that the organisation ensures correct and timely dissemination of news to the media. Professional help can be utilised to read and edit such communications to make them ‘idiot proof’ – words like suspect/allege/fear, which we use interchangeably, have different innuendoes when it comes to media space.

Indian army has singularly failed in this respect. Instead of depending on amateurish Sainik Samachar (issued by the Ministry of Defence), it should undertake dissemination of facts in a forthright manner and clear misconceptions. Rumours and loose talk gain credence only in the absence of authentic version of the facts. In the recent past, we were witness to totally misinformed media campaigns about Sukhna and Adarsh Society. It was a major failure of the army not to educate the media and the campaign to tarnish army’s image ran unopposed. Not a single communication was issued to clarify the facts. In addition to traditional conventional media tools, the army must utilise interactive web sites and blogs. These modern communication tools provide two-way interaction, thereby facilitating gauging of public attitude and feelings. Such feedback helps in modification of communication strategy.

Skilled Articulation by Senior Officers and Ex-Servicemen

Although India does not have the convention of senior army officers addressing media on regular basis, whenever a Chief interacts with the media, he gets wide coverage. Such opportunities should be utilised to project correct and honest facts before the country. Unfortunately, in the recent past such interactions have proved to be highly detrimental to the reputation of the army. As is the practice in the US and other countries, senior army officers should be trained to interact with the media to put across facts and opinions in a coherent and objective manner.

Due to a lack of genuine content, all TV channels resort to conducting group discussions with invited experts. It is the most cost-effective option available to them. Senior retired army officers located in NCR are a common feature of these discussions. They come ill-prepared and are generally not fully conversant with the complexities of the subjects under discussion. Consequently, they do more harm than good to army’s standing.

The army must utilise this powerful source and utilise the services of suitable retired officers to project facts and opinions in a well-considered and balanced manner. A small cell can be established in the Army Headquarters to brief officers and apprise them about the main issues before they appear before TV cameras. The aim should not to tutor them to parrot official lines but to equip them with full information to take their own call. If the US can utilise the services of ex-Presidents to further national interests, the army can certainly benefit from the freedom of speech enjoyed by the retired officers.

Conduct in Public

Conduct in public is by far the most effective public-relations exercise. Unfortunately, citizens do not see soldiers undergoing extreme privations in inhospitable border areas. They form their impressions about soldiers and the army through their limited interaction in cities. It is essential that the dress and conduct of soldiers at public places like railway platforms and markets are exemplary.

Minimum discomfort should be caused to the general public by our actions. Every time a road is blocked temporarily or permanently in the name of security concerns, the debarred civilian users wonder whether their own army cares for their convenience. Similarly, whenever normal traffic is stalled to make way for a senior officer to jump the red light, the affected commuters feel slighted and offended. Incorrectly parked military vehicles in crowded markets invariably invite unflattering comments from the inconvenienced public. These aspects need strict disciplinary enforcement.

Conclusion

To start with, the army must never try to ‘manage/manipulate the media’. It pays to be honest and accept blame, where due. The army must tell the environment that like normal social organisations, military consists of living human beings with their normal share of failings and idiosyncrasies. Therefore, some aberrations are bound to occur. However, what needs to be emphasised is the fact that the number of acts of indiscipline in a 1.3 million strong force is miniscule. Moreover, prompt disciplinary action is always initiated against defaulters. Unlike other organisations, the army has a very effective self-correcting mechanism in place.

The last decade has been a testing one for the Indian army. Due to high-expectancy syndrome public has zero tolerance for any transgressions by the soldiers, howsoever insignificant they may be. Resultantly, flak received by the army even for minor indiscretions is totally out of all proportions. Therefore, army’s public-relation campaign has to function under this constraint of high expectancy. Professional and scientific techniques to be employed have to be specifically evolved to correct misconceptions.

Cost consciousness in defence procurements

Cost consciousness in defence procurements

Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM, PhD

Although optimal utilisation of the allocated budgetary resources is one of the stated aims of Indian defence procurement procedure (DPP), scant attention is paid to it. It will not be incorrect to state that there is a total lack of cost consciousness in defence procurements. Sadly, there is a misconception in the minds of procurement functionaries that the whole concept of cost consciousness is limited to buying cheapest product that fulfills laid down Services Qualitative Requirements (SQR). Therefore, DPP-2008 lays considerable stress on identifying the lowest bidder amongst the technically acceptable vendors. Other aspects which are equally vital are totally neglected. It is quite a juvenile approach while dealing with defence purchases worth billions of dollars.

Cost consciousness in defence procurements is a multifaceted and all encompassing discipline, as discussed below:-

· Purchasing equipment for the sake of buying the latest in the world market is a very costly trap many nations have realised at a huge cost. Therefore, all procurements must be need based. They should either cover existing critical equipment gaps or enhance own operational capability for assigned role and assignments.

· While preparing SQR, performance capabilities sought should be exploitable. Equipment must dovetail in the overall equipment profile. There is no point in seeking a field gun with range for which matching target acquisition capabilities are lacking. Similarly, it is futile to ask for deep sea diving equipment capable of going to 120 feet depth if own troops are trained to go down to 40 feet depth only.

· Thorough knowledge of usability of projected equipment in own terrain and climatic conditions must be ascertained. Equipment developed for European plains and temperatures may fail to perform in the hot and dusty environment of Indian deserts. Similarly, bridging equipment suited for European rivers may prove unusable in Indian fast flowing rivers and canals with uneven beds. Procurement of portable piers with Medium Girder Bridges by India proved to be a costly mistake

· For the armed forces, mission accomplishment is the central issue. All possible alternatives should be analysed to opt for the most cost effective option. For example, there are multiple ways of delivering ordnance on a hostile target at a given range to inflict required damage. Similarly, enemy mine fields can be breached in a number of ways. Comparative analysis of all methods that fulfill operational requirements should be carried out to identify the least expensive option.

· Efforts should be made by the services to explore all possibilities of making do with equipment which is commonly available off the shelf in the civil market. It is a highly cost-effective choice with assured back up support. Similarly, application of dual-use technology can save considerable resources through economies of scale by defraying cost of acquisition.

· Finally, it is life cycle cost (LCC) of equipment that should be considered. LCC takes into account total cost of owning equipment throughout its service life. In the case of major military equipment, sustenance costs are much higher than acquisition costs. Equipment purchased on the basis of initial cost may turn out to be more expensive in the long run. Therefore, it is essential to consider total cost of ownership.

Unfortunately, DPP neglects all above aspects. The services put up an acquisition proposal to Ministry of Defence (MoD) justifying its need. Once MoD approval is accorded, the Service Headquarters (SHQ) concerned is asked to formulate SQR. SQR are minimum performance parameters which reflect users’ requirements in a comprehensive, structured, concrete and unambiguous manner. In other words, SQR are minimum functional characteristics based

The services formulate SQR on the basis of what they consider to be essential military requirements corresponding to the tasks to be performed by the equipment. Financial impact while evolving parameters is never considered as budgetary support is provided on the basis of overall indicative outlay. SQR formulation is the prerogative of SHQ. No questions are asked by MoD and the procurement process is initiated by issuing Request for Proposals (RFP). As no deviation or moderation of SQR is allowed after the issuance of RFP, cost continues to be a non-issue.

The above arrangement, in which SHQ and MoD work in water tight compartments, is highly harmful to Indian interests. There is no dialogue between the two as regards SQR and related costs whereas minor moderation of a particular parameter, albeit within acceptable limits, may result in huge savings and better value for money. It is accepted that the final decision for any change in SQR must certainly rest with SHQ. For that, necessary cost related inputs need to be provided to them.

Performance-Cost Relationship

While formulating SQR, SHQ has to remember that every increase in parameters has associated cost penalty as cost is a function of performance. However, the relationship between performance attributes and cost is not in direct proportion to each other as defence equipment is highly technology-sensitive. With every technology jump, cost may escalate multifold. On the other hand, for stabilized technologies, cost accretion may be minimal. Therefore, while fixing parameters, it is essential to ascertain their inescapability with reference to cost penalty.

Weighted Aggregate Performance Index (WAPI)-Cost analysis provides an ideal tool to establish relationship between performance and cost to enable diligent decision making for obtaining best value for money. The process is carried out in four stages:-

(a) SHQ lists out all parameters and assigns inter-se weightage as regards their criticality for full operational exploitation of the equipment. It is a painstaking task requiring thorough knowledge of likely mission assignment and deployment of equipment. WAPI is evolved and index scores for different performance levels calculated.

(b) Detailed market survey of various types of technologies and their state of development is carried out to ascertain compatibility with parameters evolved.

(c) WAPI-Cost analysis is conducted to establish relationship between index score and cost. A detailed examination is carried out to determine index score at which best value for money is obtainable with all performance parameters being fully complied with. Additionally, the analysis helps in the identification of the most cost-effective technology.

(d) Finalised index score helps in the evolution of revised performance parameters which lay down minimum inescapable standards while rewarding superior performance, albeit within acceptable ranges. SHQ forwards procurement proposal to MoD to initiate procurement process.

Constant requirement for superior military systems results in demand for cutting edge technology. Therefore, technology upgradation takes place at regular periodicity. In the sample illustration of WAPI-Cost analysis below, every technology transition from one generation to the next has been shown in red. The period of technology maturing that follows every technology transition has been marked in blue. It is a stage of experimentation during which technology is mastered, its application explored and general road map of system development formulated. Finally, once technology gets stabilized as regards its application, serial production commences. During this phase, improvements in equipment continue to take place within the broad contours of the same generation of technology.

Technology Maturing Stage

Sample Illustration: WAPI-Cost Analysis

As can be seen in the graph, equipment having WAPI index Q will cost considerably more than equipment with WAPI index marginally lower at P. This is because of the technology jump involved. Therefore, most cost-effective zone for procurement is closer to the peaking of a technology, as marked on the graph. There are two reasons for the same. One, as a particular level of technology gets optimally developed, its developmental costs get defrayed and sheer economies of scale keep the costs down. Secondly, during the stabilisation period many other producers develop competing technologies, thereby generating competition and preventing monopoly. Thus, a buyer gets the benefit of matured, tested and in-production technology with multiple producers and assured technical support.

The Way Ahead

Even in day to day dealings, all buy decisions are taken after ascertaining costs involved. Many times specifications are moderated within acceptable limits to affect large savings. However, the Indian defence procurement system does not consider cost to be a material factor. SHQ formulate parameters seeking the best in the world without reference to outlay. No detailed technology scan and market survey are carried out to establish performance-cost linkages. Once MoD receives SQR from SHQ, it initiates procurement process accordingly. Cost continues to remain neglected whereas huge savings can be affected through minor acceptable moderation of SQR.

It is understandable that SQR cannot be diluted after the issuance of RFP as that would invite charges of partisanship. However, related costs should always be considered before finalising SQR. WAPI-Cost analysis is a valuable scientific tool that can prove immensely beneficial in the formulation of performance parameters to identify the most cost-effective option and technology. Cost consciousness must become a key factor in decision making. It must, however, be reiterated that SHQ ought to continue to have the final say on SQR and performance-cost trade off. Being the ultimate users, the services know their requirements best and there should be no compromise on this account.

Stumbling Blocks: Technology transfer under ‘Buy and Make’ is a misnomer

Stumbling Blocks: Technology transfer under ‘Buy and Make’ is a misnomer

Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM, PhD

All proposals for the procurement of new equipment are debated in the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) and categorised as ‘Buy’, ‘Buy and Make’ and ‘Make’ cases. ‘Buy’ implies outright purchase of the complete quantity required. In case the requirement is large, it is considered prudent to adopt ‘Buy and Make’ route. It entails initial purchase of limited quantity in fully built up form, followed by licenced production/ indigenous production of the balance requirement. Finally, ‘Make’ cases refer to indigenous development of the equipment.

India has been exercising ‘Buy’ option in respect of high-tech, high value and urgently required procurements. As in all such cases the quantity required is limited, and it is not considered cost-effective to create infra-structure for subsequent manufacture within the country. Some of the major ‘Buy’ cases finalised in the recent past relate to Weapon Locating Radars, C-130J-30 Super Hercules Transport aircraft, P-8I Boeing Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance aircraft and Smerch Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers. Recently, the Government has issued Request for Proposal (RFP) for outright purchase of 140 155mm/52 calibre Ultra-Light Howitzer guns.

As regards ‘Make’ cases, India has nothing to show for its efforts of over the last five decades. Conversion of the much hyped Trishul missile defence system into a technology demonstration programme once again proved the failure of India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) to develop any high-tech equipment in the promised time-frame and conforming to the accepted parameters. It has been a chronicle of tall claims and abject failures. Therefore, it was decided in 2006 to revise ‘Make’ category and limit the role of DRDO to the development of projects requiring sophisticated technology of strategic, complex and security sensitive nature. Development of high tech equipment has been assigned to Integrated Project Management Teams under the Acquisition Wing of the Ministry of Defence (MoD)

However, it is ‘Buy and Make’ category that is considered the preferred route for most of the large quantity high value contracts. Instead of procuring the complete quantity in fully built up condition, India buys some and manufactures the balance under transfer of technology (ToT). Earlier when the erstwhile USSR was the sole supplier of defence equipment to India, acquisition of all major weapon platforms followed the same route.

The history of production of tanks in India is indicative of India’s continued dependence on licenced production. Manufacture of T-55 tanks in India began in early 1970s under a ‘Buy and Make’ arrangement. T-72 and T-90 have followed the same route. Apparently, India has gained little during the last four decades in terms of technology to be self reliant. Similar course has been followed in the case of fighter aircraft – from old warhorse MiG 21 to current Sukhoi series.

Jaguar aircraft from the UK were also licence manufactured in India. The trend continues with renewed intensity. A contract for Hawk jet trainers was signed with BAE in 2004 for 66 Hawk trainers – 24 to be supplied by BAE in flyaway condition while the remaining 42 are being manufactured in India under technology transfer licence. As per reports appearing in the press, an additional requirement of 57 aircraft is being projected now.

Request for proposals (RFP) issued for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) for a projected cost of over 10 billion dollars contains the clause that the first 18 aircraft will come in a ‘fly away’ condition, while the remaining 108 will be manufactured under ToT. It is reported that the Government wants to retain an option for an additional quantity of 64 aircraft on the same terms, thereby bringing the total quantity to 190 aircraft.

Indian RFP for 197 light helicopters (133 for the Indian army and 64 for the Air Force) to replace its aging Chetak and Cheetah fleet worth close to 600 million dollars also contains the clause that 60 helicopters would be bought outright, with the remaining 137 being built under license by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). Similarly, as per the RFP issued for 155mm 52-calibre towed guns, India wants to buy 400 guns off-the-shelf and produce 1,100 guns in India under licence.

Stated Advantages of ‘Buy and Make’

Once a decision is taken to categorise a procurement proposal as “Buy and Make’, the Department of Defence Production (DDP) is asked to nominate an agency to receive technology for indigenous production. The Production Agency (PA) so nominated is thereafter co-opted in the preparation of RFP to oversee all aspects concerning ToT. As all defence public sector units and the ordnance factories (collectively referred to as the public sector hereto after) come under DDP, it is always one of them that gets nominated as PA. Private sector companies, even if more suitable to receive and absorb technology, are never considered for nomination as PA. At times a public sector entity is nominated as PA only because it does not have adequate work load, its suitability being of little consequence.

As seen above, ‘Buy and Make’ continues to be the preferred route. Four major reasons advanced in its favour are as follows:-

· Gains from Technology Import

Technology received under ‘Buy and Make’ helps raise threshold of indigenous knowledge which acts as a take-off platform for further progression. Instead of reinventing the wheel, India takes a technology jump to catch up with the latest advancements. Imported technology provides an impetus to indigenous research and development in defence systems, thereby reducing dependence on foreign suppliers for future requirements and making India self-reliant.

· Saving of Resources

Indigenous manufacture is considerably more cost-effective than procuring fully manufactured equipment, even though all major assemblies and critical components are supplied by the foreign vendor.

· Assured Life Time Support to Equipment

By establishing production infrastructure in India, life time technical and spare-parts support is ensured for the equipment. Thus, dependence on foreign suppliers gets eliminated. Additionally, indigenisation of critical components goes a long way to ensure serviceability of equipment.

· Social and Economic Benefits

Inflow of assembly work creates considerable number of jobs in the country which would be lost in case India procures complete requirement in assembled condition. Most of the defence public sector units (DPSU) are thriving on assembly work as very little indigenous developmental work has resulted in production orders. In case assembly orders dry up, DPSU would be strapped for work.

Appraisal of ‘Buy and Make’ Policy

India has been adopting ‘Buy and Make’ route for decades now. Enough time has passed and considerable experience has been gained for an objective assessment of various facets of the policy.

Technology transfer under ‘Buy and Make’ is a misnomer. In fact it is the biggest myth that is being perpetuated with total disregard to ground realities. No technology gets transferred to India at all. What the foreign vendors provide are rudimentary drawings to assemble equipment. Indigenous production is nothing except assembling of sub-assemblies and components to deliver fully built units to the services. Therefore, India gains nothing as regards technological know-how from such an arrangement.

Take the case of T-series tanks - India has been producing them since early 1970s, yet our competence to improve upon the imported know-how is pathetic. India procured T-55 tanks along with technology for indigenous manufacture. When T-55 became obsolete and needed replacement, India had to rush abroad for T-72 tanks with ToT. Even after manufacturing hundreds of these tanks, India could not master the technology or improve upon it. It was again Russia that provided T-90 tanks to replace the ageing fleet. Once again India has bought technology for licenced production in India. If every time India has to resort to import of newer versions, technology infusion means little.

Such an arrangement suits the foreign vendors ideally. They do not part with their closely guarded technology as that guarantees them continued business by perpetuating India’s dependence on them. They provide assembly drawings and nothing else. India has to keep importing critical sub-assemblies and components from them, thereby assuring long-term business to them. Citing inflation, they keep raising prices as well. The net result is that instead of importing fully built units, India imports equipment in semi-knocked down or fully knocked down condition for indigenous assembly.

‘Buy and Make’ policy appears custom-made for India’s DPSU. Unlike the private sector, they do not have to strive and compete for business. Their struggle is limited to intense lobbying in the corridors of DDP for nomination as PA. A nomination means assured business for years with no riders of cost, quality and delivery schedule. No mastery of advanced technical knowledge is required to assemble equipment. Therefore, without much sweat, DPSU starts producing equipment.

Although the role of nominated PA is limited to putting together sub-assemblies and pasting its own label on the assembled product, it charges a huge profit for its efforts. At times, the services are hard pressed to accept prices quoted by them. They border on exorbitance. There have been times when it was felt that import of fully built up equipment would have been a cheaper option. Many equate such PA with middlemen and traders who charge hefty commission (fancifully called value addition) for facilitating imports.

India’s defence research and development efforts have also not benefited from ‘Buy and Make’ deals. Every time new equipment is imported, DRDO strips it open to learn through reverse engineering. In the absence of detailed drawings, DRDO’s efforts remain confined to duplication rather than absorption of technology. Not one case can be quoted where DRDO has learnt from imported technology to develop better products indigenously.

Even in the case of essential spares, India has never achieved self-reliance. Every foreign vendor ensures that India remains dependent on him for critical spares. He thus retains effective leverage and exploits it by hefty price increases. Even after decades of manufacturing T-series of tanks and MiG aircraft, India looks up to Russia to keep its fleet functional. It is a sad reflection of futility of current mode of ToT.

India has certainly been able to replicate some imported components under its indigenisation programme, but this process is limited to items like washers, seals and other commonplace components. As no foreign vendor parts with metallurgical know-how, even critical nuts and bolts cannot be manufactured locally and have to be imported.

Absence of genuine transfer of technology can also be gauged from the fact that India cannot even upgrade the equipment manufactured under ToT. In every case, the foreign vendor has to be approached. He develops the kit, upgrades some numbers and thereafter, the balance quantity is upgraded indigenously under the same ‘Buy and Make’ route. The foreign vendor thus not only charges huge fees but also ensures that his business thrives through selling of upgrade kits to India.

Finally, most ToT agreements get embroiled in controversy. It is alleged that foreign vendors tend to renege from their contractual obligations by resorting to skewed and subjective interpretation of various clauses. Recent reports of Russia’s intransigence and non-cooperative attitude in respect of ToT for T-90 tanks amply proves this point. With little leverage, India is always on the receiving end with insincere foreign vendors trying to exploit small print in contracts.

The Way Forward

‘Buy and Make’ policy has the following fallout:-

· As the recipient of technology is always a public sector entity, entry of the private sector in defence production gets effectively blocked. It is a neat stratagem to perpetuate the monopoly of the public sector. The role of the private sector remains restricted to supplying components and sub-assemblies to the public sector. That is one of the reasons why the private sector continues to be a fringe player.

· Due to the availability of assured business opportunities through nomination as PA, the public sector never feels the need to update its technology or improve its skills. It remains smug in the knowledge that it has only to keep the decision makers of DDP in good humour to get orders. In the absence of any competition, the public sector becomes complacent and fails to modernise itself.

· Being part of MoD, every public sector PA treats the services as captive customers. The services have to suffer indifferent quality and delayed deliveries. As seen earlier, the public sector assembles sub-assemblies and puts its own tag and charges hefty profit. Frequent and unwarranted price increases make products unjustly expensive. In other words, the defence budget is made to bear the burden of ensuring survival of the public sector.

· Knowledgeable vendors find ‘Buy and Make’ route to be the most remunerative mode of doing business with India. They make huge profits by piggyback riding on the public sector. They have learnt that the public sector continues to call shots in India. They manage to court it by promising licenced production with ToT. Once a contract is signed continuous flow of business is ensured for decades - initially by supplying fully built units and subsequently by providing sub-assemblies and critical components.

· No real transfer of technology takes place. No expert agency monitors ground implementation. The complete responsibility is assigned to PA. Unfortunately, neither PA nor the foreign vendor is keen to carry it out sincerely. PA is happy as long as it can keep assembling equipment to sell to the services.

The net result is that the Indian defence industry continues to suffer. As no genuine transfer of technology takes place, India remains a laggard. It will not be incorrect to state that India’s ‘Buy and Make’ policy has succeeded only in impeding development of indigenous competence and perpetuating dependence on imports.
Worse, this policy effectively rules out any role for the private sector, thereby denying the country of its prowess.

According to Defence Procurement Procedure – 2008, suitable PA could be selected from any of the public/private sector firms including a joint venture company, based on the inputs from DDP and, if required, from DRDO. Unfortunately, the above provision means little. Inputs and recommendations of DDP are always in favour of the public sector. In a recent case, DDP went to the extent of nominating a public sector company peremptorily as the sole development and production agency in a ‘Make’ case, flouting its own written policy.

India must take three steps urgently to set things right. First, DDP should be abolished. It is an archaic department with biased mindsets. DDP is known for its impedimentary role in the modernisation of the services. It contributes little and delays all proposals till the public sector is accepted as the sole supplier. A new department called Department of Defence Industry should be created to oversee development of Indian defence industry (both the public and the private sectors) in an integrated and synchronised manner.

Secondly, time has come to involve the private sector at the categorisation of proposals stage itself, albeit within the constraints of secrecy requirements. As monopoly breeds complacency, open competition should be encouraged to force the industry to upgrade its technology and skills for survival. The most suitable entity should be selected to receive technology. The country can ill-afford to continue to sustain inefficient public sector companies through unwarranted patronage.

And finally, the complete gamut of technology and its transfer should be administered by a duly constituted Defence Technology Oversight Committee (DTOC). DTOC should identify level and scope of technology needed to be imported, identify suitable recipients and oversee smooth transfer and absorption on ground. It must be appreciated that purchase of technology costs the country dear. Full advantage must be taken of it for the advancement of indigenous industry. It is too serious a matter to be left to the diligence and prudence of nominated defence sector entities.