Vulnerability
of FMS Route to Abuse
Major
General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM, PhD
Two
developments have brought the issue of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) deals under
the public spotlight once again. First, there were reports in the press stating
that the Army Chief had drawn the attention of the Government to serious maintenance
problems being faced in the earlier FMS deals. The second development pertains
to reported overpricing of Boeing C-17 heavy lift transport aircraft. Press
reports allege that the US had pegged the value of the deal at USD
4.1 billion during President Obama's visit to India in 2010, at a unit cost of
USD 410 million for ten aircraft. Considering the sale price of USD 300 million
per aircraft charged from Australia, the total package should not cost India
more than USD 3 billion. Worse, while notifying the US Congress, the US has
pegged the value of the proposed deal at USD 5.8 billion. It implies that India
will be over-charged by 37 percent if the package cost is USD 4.1 billion and a
whopping 93 percent if hiked to USD 5.8 billion.
India
has been increasingly resorting to purchases through FMS route. Starting with
the procurement of 8 AN/TPQ-37 Fire
Finder counter-battery artillery radars in 2002, India has found FMS route to
be a convenient mode to bypass the complexities of the Defence Procurement
Procedure. More importantly, being government-to-government deals, they are projected
to be above board and free of all extraneous influences. Other major deals
signed under FMS route include purchase of six C-130J Hercules transport
aircraft for USD 962 million and naval vessel Trenton for USD 88 million.
As two major deals for C-17 aircraft for the Air Force
and 155mm Light-Weight Towed Howitzers for the Army are presently under
advanced stage of negotiations, it is time a closer look is taken at the
intricacies of FMS process.
Attributes
of FMS Route
FMS is one of the two common routes adopted by the
US to sell military equipment to foreign countries; the other one being Direct
Commercial Sales (DCS), under which defence manufacturers are free to sell
their product to foreign buyers, albeit subject to the licencing regime. Under
DCS route, US companies have to compete with producers from other nations to
bag orders. Both technical and commercial aspects dictate selection of the
winner. Therefore, US manufacturers are forced to price their product very
competitively. Thus, DCS is a tough and laborious process – more struggle and
less profitability.
On the other hand, FMS route provides an ideal
opportunity to well-networked US producers to bag orders without much sweat by
piggyback riding on US government’s initiatives. Further, in order to exercise
stricter export control, Security Assistance Management Manual provides for
designating certain items of critical nature as “FMS only”, thereby increasing
incidence of FMS deals.
FMS is a five stage process, as follows:-
a)
Prospective buyer
nation submits a Letter of Request (LOR) to the US Government’s Defence
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
b)
After notifying
the US Congress of possible sale, DSCA sends a Letter of Offer (LOO) to the
requesting government. It contains all terms and conditions of the proposed
sale.
c)
The buying government
is required to submit a Letter of Acceptance (LOA) along with the initial
advance.
d)
A legal contract
is signed.
e) The US Government supplies the item either from its
own existing stocks or after fresh procurement from the producer.
For buyer nations, FMS route has both positive and
negative attributes. These are summarised below:-
a)
Benefits of FMS Route. Being government-to-government transactions, a
certain degree of sovereign guarantee is inbuilt in the system and quality-cum-performance
parameters are assured. There are no middlemen. As the US Government procures
the item as per its normal procedures, the buyer nation is saved considerable
effort. Further, the US Government is in a better position to provide logistic,
training and exploitation support since the item is already in use with its
forces. It is an ideal route for the US allies who have common operational
doctrine and where inter-operability of equipment is an essential
consideration.
b)
Weaknesses of FMS Route. The equipment would have been developed
specifically for the US forces, keeping in mind their capabilities, doctrine
and envisaged operational exploitation. A buyer country has to accept the equipment
as it exists and cannot evolve its own parameters – the equipment may not match
its requirements fully. Worse, the US Government insists that the buyer nation
signs the contract on the dotted lines and does not entertain any suggestions
for alterations. It is a ‘take it or leave it’ situation for a buyer.
An
Appraisal
This article endeavours to examine FMS procedure to ascertain
if FMS deals are really as fair, transparent and cost-effective as claimed.
a)
Probity and Manipulation
The single most important reason cited repeatedly in
favour of FMS route is the total absence of middlemen as transactions are
directly between the two governments. This is a most fallacious logic as it
totally ignores the activities that precede selection of FMS route by a
country. The whole process of coercing a prospective buyer nation to abandon
open competition and seek US equipment on a single vendor basis is carried out
in an apparently innocuous but surreptitious manner.
First, through a large number of pro-active
corporate executives, deep inroads are made into the decision making apparatus
through social networking. Repeated presentations are made to convince the key
government officials of the unmatched superiority of the US equipment. All
possible stratagems are employed to bring dissenting officials around. Even
promises of facilitating grant of green cards to their progeny are dangled. To
obtain favourable media coverage, members of think tanks and media are taken to
visit their factories and ‘looked after’. Efforts are made to have every
important functionary on board (or in pocket) so that no objections are raised
at any level once the proposal to opt for FMS route gets activated. It is a
painstaking and time consuming task but considered highly rewarding by big
players.
Secondly, all efforts are made, both overtly and
covertly, to torpedo every attempt at procurement through competitive route. Overt
means employed are representations to the government, hard-selling by visiting
US dignitaries and seeking intervention of known pro-US Indian officials.
Covert means include sowing seeds of doubts about the competitors in the minds
of public through planted stories and third-party complaints. The aim is simple
– eliminate all competition by having them blacklisted through selective leaks
and innuendoes. Slowly a stage is reached when the buyer nation is forced to
opt for FMS route for its emergent requirements. Has not the case of 155mm Light-Weight
Towed Howitzers followed a similar path?
b)
Pricing Conundrum
Advocates of FMS also claim it to be a
cost-effective option as the buyer nation gets equipment at the rate at which it
is purchased for the US forces. Unfortunately, it is a misrepresentation of
facts. The pricing process is highly exploitative, subjective and cloaked in
secrecy. The following points need to be highlighted:-
· A buyer nation can never get to compare prices of an
item available through FMS and DCS routes, thereby getting deprived of an
opportunity to opt for the cheaper route. No purchaser can obtain DCS price
quote after submitting LOR under FMS. Similarly, all DCS negotiations have to
be aborted by a purchaser before submitting LOR. It is a highly unreasonable arrangement
and contravenes norms of fair trade practices.
· The US Government imposes additional handling
charges for sales negotiations, case implementation, contract negotiation,
contract management, financial management and allied expenses. In other words,
the final FMS price includes administrative surcharge and contract
administration services costs. Additionally, Arms Export Control Act requires a
charge for a proportionate amount of any nonrecurring costs of research,
development and production of major defence equipment sold through FMS.
· The buyer nation gets to know the final price of
equipment only after its delivery. Prior to that, only estimated price and
payment schedules are intimated to the buyers.
· Under the provisions of Defence Federal Acquisition
Regulation Supplement of May 1995, the US government allows its defence
producers to recover ‘offset costs’ from buyer nations. However, the producers
are required to factor it in the unit cost of main equipment and not mention it
separately. This effectively hides the true value of offset cost-penalty from
the buyers and provides an avenue for undue price hikes.
c) Contractual
Blackmail
It is a standard trade practice that both the seller
and the buyer negotiate various terms and conditions to arrive at mutually
acceptable provisions for inclusion in the contract. In the case of FMS, it is a
unilateral process. A copy of the pre-drafted contract is handed over to the
buyer nation for signing. No questions or changes are entertained. Needless to
say, every sentence of the draft is loaded in favour of the US Government. Provisions pertaining to offsets and
technical support are symptomatic of asymmetrical contractual obligations.
Worse, no assurance against future embargos/bans is provided.
While proclaiming a hands-off policy with regard to
offset practices, the US Government allows its producers to recover offset
overheads from a buyer nation. Yet, it does not guarantee fulfillment of offset
obligations. A purchaser country is advised to negotiate a separate offset
agreement directly with the prime contractor. It is a strange way to abdicate
responsibility. As payments against the main contract are made directly to the
US Government, the buyer nation cannot withhold them in case of offset
defaults.
Two important points relating to technical support
for the equipment sold under FMS have also been a cause of disquiet. One, in
the initial package, excessive quantities of support equipment and spares are
included. As a buyer country is not fully conversant with the equipment at the
time of purchase, it has to accept whatever is included in the package. It is
only at a later stage that it realises their futility. The second point is
about the lack of guarantee of continued US support. As has been India’s
experience with fire finder radars, back up technical support is not as
forthcoming as it should be. Spare parts take unduly long to materialise,
keeping critical equipment in off-road state for disquietingly long periods.
The
Way Forward
India’s much hyped defence procurement procedure is
based on the fundamental principle of transparency, free competition and
impartiality. Every FMS deal violates the said principle. There is a total lack
of transparency as no Request for Information is issued to the environment to
let possible competitors know of the impending procurement and facilitate their
participation. LOR is sent to the US Government without any publicity. In many
cases, the information becomes public only when DSCA notifies the US Congress
of the possible sale. By then it is invariably too late for other vendors to
intervene.
FMS is a non-competitive and single vendor process
wherein no tenders are issued to generate competition by seeking
techno-commercial bids from multiple vendors. FMS deals effectively circumvent all
competition. Apparently, any process in which a single vendor is pre-selected
for the placement of orders can never be impartial.
It is not that FMS route should be totally shunned. It
should be adopted to procure cutting-edge equipment that is unavailable from
any alternate source. FMS route also acts as a tool of foreign policy to
develop closer strategic synergy with the US. However, India must curb its
penchant for resorting to FMS route to circumvent convolutions of DPP and finding
an easy way out to affect procurements. Importantly, India must demand a right
to negotiate contractual terms to safeguard its interests.
Finally, undoubtedly FMS route is cleverly exploited
by experienced US manufacturers to bag multi-million dollar deals with the active
help of the US Government. To coax Indian decision makers to shed open
competition and opt for single vendor FMS route requires considerable persuasion
skills, networking and even ‘sweeteners’. Non-US companies allege unfair
tweaking of procedures and manipulation of policies to their disadvantage. They
are convinced that the whole process is not above board.
This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.
ReplyDeleteDear Maj General Suman,
ReplyDeleteTo what extent does arms agent still play a role in helping companies clinch deal ? Can this be stopped in the greater interest of this country ?
Regards,
Shiv