Defence Reforms: Expert Committees or Futile Charades

Defence Reforms: Expert Committees or Futile Charades 

(FORCE September 2013)

Major General Mrinal Suman

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986 (GNA) is generally considered to be the first step in the currently ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). 

Major blame for the US failure in the Vietnam War was apportioned to segregated planning and operations, resulting in inhibiting the development of a unified war strategy. The catastrophic failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980, the infirmities noticed in the invasion of Grenada in 1983 and inability to respond appropriately when 241 US marines were killed in a terrorist attack in Lebanon convinced all that emergent reforms were needed in the US defence organisation. 

Succumbing to the public outcry, President Ronald Reagan appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on defence management in 1985. It was tasked to examine the complete gamut of management, organisation and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defence and propose changes as required. 

The deliberations of BRC were open to the public. All issues were thoroughly debated in the media. Many members of the strategic community submitted their recommendations. A large number of think tanks were consulted. Goldwater-Nichols Bill was the final result and was debated at length in the Congress as well. President Ronald Reagan signed it in October 1986. The restructuring provided unity of command, unity of effort, integrated planning, shared procurement and a reduction in inter-services rivalry.

The above has been recalled to highlight three important aspects. First, considering it to be a matter of national concern, public participation was welcomed by BRC. Candid and wide-ranging discussions were held with all segments. Concerned citizens and military thinkers took active interest, thereby generating an intense public debate. Secondly, the deliberations were held in an utmost transparent manner. The façade of secrecy was not cunningly used to deny access to the interested participants. Thirdly and most importantly, expert recommendations were accepted by the US Government. Officials were not allowed to appropriate the right to sit in judgment over the recommendations of BRC.  

The Indian Conundrum 

Compare the above with the indifferent handling of the issues concerning reforms in the management of national security in India. The whole country was traumatized when 527 brave Indian soldiers lost their lives and 1363 got wounded due to the treacherous incursion by Pakistan in the Kargil Sector. Although India managed to evict the enemy, failure of intelligence and infirmities of military response exposed major chinks in India’s higher defence management regime.

With a view to reform the national security apparatus, the Government constituted the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) in July 1999 under K Subrahmanyam to review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil Sector; and recommend such measures as considered necessary to guard against such armed intrusions. KRC report was made public after deleting certain portions considered security-sensitive.

In April 2000, a Group of Ministers (GoM) under the Deputy Prime Minister was asked to review the national security system in its entirety with special reference to the recommendations of KRC and formulate specific proposals for implementation. GoM submitted its report in February 2001. Amongst its recommendations, the most critical one pertained to the reorganisation of the higher defence set-up with a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) at the top.

The report was considered by the Cabinet Committee on Security in May 2001. Whereas it accepted other recommendations, the government decided to consult other political parties regarding the creation of the institution of CDS before taking any decision. A rare opportunity to reform the system was lost.  

As all other reforms were to flow from the appointment of CDS, other measures meant little – a white elephant called the Integrated Defence Staff that keeps strutting like a headless chicken; a non-performing Defence Acquisition Wing; and a toothless Defence Intelligence Agency. Thus it was business as usual at MoD.

After losing 10 precious years, a task force was constituted under Naresh Chandra in June 2011 to carry out a review of the progress made and contemporise KRC’s recommendations. The task force included 16 best strategic brains in the country. It submitted its report in mid-2012. Although the report has not been made public as yet, media reports indicate that the recommendations include integration of the services and MoD through cross-postings; reorienting national security strategy from Pakistan to China; and appointment of a permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOSC) with a fixed tenure of two years.

Corroborating KRC’s prophetic caution that ‘the political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo’, the government has constituted another committee to analyse the recommendations of the task force. Whereas the task force showed urgency and worked assiduously to submit its report in a year, the government has already wasted much more time in studying it. 

Being the major stakeholder, MoD was also asked to offer its comments. It is learnt that all the key recommendations made by the task force have been opposed by it. MoD feels that the current dispensation is working well and no changes are warranted. 

Futility of Expert Committees

The above state of affairs raises a key issue. Expert committees are constituted to study complex issues that need holistic and multi-dimensional treatment for which the serving officials do not possess required expertise. For that reason, expert committees are invariably broad based and consist of well-known experts in different fields. Being outside the governmental loop, the experts can analyse all inter-related complexities in a non-partisan and objective manner. 

Further, before finalising their recommendations, expert committees hold extensive discussions with the serving officials to understand the challenges faced by them. Due importance is given to their viewpoint. As a matter of fact, all concerned governmental agencies are provided an opportunity to present their perspective and suggestions.

Thus recommendations made by such committees are invariably based on a detailed study of all related imperatives and wide ranging dialogues. Such recommendations cannot be questioned for their objectivity and soundness. Therefore, the government ought to accept the recommendations without any reservations.

Three aspects need to be underlined here. First, expert committees are constituted for well thought-through and holistic specialised guidance. Strangely, instead of accepting their recommendations, the serving officials usurp the right to accept or reject them in the mistaken belief that they know better than the expert committees. If that be so, why have committees in the first place? It is a weird approach and defies logic.

  

Secondly, the whole country has a right to know as to what the recommendations are and the reasons for their rejection. Security of the nation cannot be the exclusive domain of the bureaucrats and the services. Every citizen has a stake in it and has a right to remain informed. Except a handful of highly classified matters most of the issues deserve no security classification and must be discussed publically in an open and transparent manner.

Finally and most importantly, comments of all entities must be made public. Citizens must know as to who is opposing reforms and the reasons thereof. Although, broad contours of the Kargil Committee Report and the Naresh Chandra Task Force are available in the public domain, rationale offered by the opponents is not known. As resistance to CDS/CCOSC is symptomatic of the malaise of stalling reforms suggested by various expert committees, the issue deserves a closer look.

Opposition to the Key Reform

Not a soul in his wisdom can question the need for jointness in military operations. Jointness means conducting integrated military operations with common strategy, methodology and conduct. It entails evolution of joint equipment policy and acquisition plans; joint planning, development of doctrine and policy-making; joint training; integrated preparation of budget and monitoring of expenditure; and joint operational commands and staff structures.

Achievement of total synergy amongst the three services is the ultimate aim of RMA and it cannot be achieved without having a joint hierarchy with a single point military advice at the pinnacle. Therefore, appointment of a principal military adviser to the government is the key reform in whose absence all other measures are infructuous. Sadly, it remains stalled.

The Naresh Chandra Task Force tried to mollify opponents of KRC’s proposed CDS by proposing creation of a permanent CCOSC, a much watered down arrangement. MoD has reportedly rejected it as well. It has cited lack of consensus amongst the services as the main reason. For MoD, it is a highly comforting situation. It wants the country to believe that it is pro-reforms but cannot take a decision unless all the three services are on board. 

The countrymen are perplexed and want to know as to which service is opposing reforms and what are the reasons advanced for its antagonism. They want to judge as to how compelling their reasoning is. In addition, inaction by MoD by blaming lack of consensus is not considered acceptable. The countrymen want to be apprised of MoD’s stand about suggested reforms and reasons for its reluctance to enforce them.  

Media reports indicate that whereas the Navy supports creation of permanent CCOSC, the Army and the Air are against the proposal. The role of the Air Force has always been obstructionist. It blocked creation of CDS in 2002-03 and now it is opposing permanent CCOSC. In informal conversations, most Air Force commanders agree that no future war can ever be won without total jointmanship. They also concede that for true synergy, directions must flow down from a unified command. Yet, reforms are opposed on specious grounds. It is a highly intriguing and paradoxical situation. 

For opposing reforms recommended by the expert committees, the Army and the Air Force are being seen as selfish and parochial entities by the countrymen. It is felt that the appointment of permanent CCOSC is opposed by the service chiefs who are worried that they would become a lesser personage. Both the services need to redeem their standing through an open debate and convincing the countrymen of the soundness of their opposition. 

As regards MoD, it hides its own opposition to the reforms by putting all the blame on the services. It is no secret that MoD bureaucrats prefer status quo. They are wary that a permanent CCOSC would diminish the role of the Defence Secretary as the final arbiter of inter-services disagreements. Further, under the present dispensation, the Defence Secretary acts as the single point advisor to the Defence Minister. Permanent CCOSC is perceived as a threat to his position of pre-eminence.  

Finally  

In its report of 2008-09, Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence expressed concern over the lack of progress in the creation of the post of CDS to boost synergy among the three services and recommended early decision-making by the Government. Instead of giving any reasons for delay or commitment for implementation, MoD expressed satisfaction at the progress being made by terming reforms to be an ‘incremental process’. If that be so, where was the need to constitute Naresh Chandra Task Force? Was it a farcical charade?

Undoubtedly, consensus is the most preferred option and public pressure can play a constructive role in achieving that. Therefore, it is essential that the recommendations of the Kargil Committee and the Naresh Chandra Task Force be made public. Thereafter, viewpoints of supporters and opponents along with detailed justification should be debated in open. All citizens have a stake in national security and deserve to know as to why some entities are opposing reforms. 

India must learn from the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. There are times in the life of a nation when hard decisions are required to be taken by the leadership. The current inter-services quibbling must not be allowed to continue. National security is too serious a matter to be permitted to be held hostage to the egocentric chiefs. Dissenting and obstructionist commanders should be treated as anti-national elements. It is essential to identify and shame them. All this can be achieved only through an open and transparent debate – fear of exposure will deter selfish elements from acting as impediments.*****