When commanders hear but do not listen

When commanders hear but do not listen

Major General Mrinal Suman

To most, hearing and listening are synonymous as both relate to the functions of the ear. However, the difference lies in the processing of the sound by the brain.

In the case of hearing, brain simply notices the sound. One hears a sound whether one wants to or not. In other words, one can hear something without wanting to; but one can only listen to something intentionally. For example, one hears a noise but listens to what is being said. 

Similarly, one can hear a conversation between two persons without listening to it. It implies absence of application of mind to that conversation. A sound is said to have been listened when the brain makes a conscious effort to take its cognizance and process it. Thus to listen to something, a deliberate effort is necessary. 

When a child approaches a busy parent with a request/problem and gets a response, ‘I have heard you’. He is quick to realise that his parent heard him but did not listen to him. The child feels hurt and sulks. By not paying attention to the child, the parent missed an opportunity to resolve a small issue and prevent its growth into a major grievance. On the other hand, there are children who are introvert by nature and keep their emotions bottled up. In such cases, challenge for the parents is much tougher. They have to be on the lookout for tell-tale signs that may indicate their disquiet. 

In many respects, command of troops is akin to the performance of parental functions. Unlike other organisations, relationship between a commander and the troops is governed by the ethical linkage of empathetic demeanor of the former and unflinching trust of the latter. Troops expect their commanders to be aware of the problems faced by them and treat them with due compassion. For that, every commander must strive to ‘listen to his command’. It is a command responsibility. 

‘Listening to one’s command’ carries a much wider meaning in the services. In addition to listening to what is being said, a commander must pay equal attention to the unsaid as well. It entails managing both extrovert and introvert troops.

As many troops stay silent, it is essential that every commander remains fully conscious of the level of satisfaction of the troops. He must have his hand on the pulse of his command to get forewarning of festering undercurrents of disaffection lest they blow-up as disciplinary challenges.

Indian soldiers are a highly disciplined lot. They do not resort to collective indiscipline or manhandle officers unless driven to it. When simmering discontentment (based on real or perceived issues) is overlooked by commanders, either through negligence or default, pent-up frustration results in a ‘pressure cooker effect’, tearing long-nurtured unit cohesion to shreds. Units afflicted by disorderly behaviour of troops take long to recover and the stigma tarnishes their proud regimental history for ever.  

The Stress Factor

Although stress is a biological term, it is commonly used in a metaphorical sense and has also come to be accepted as a euphemism for describing difficulties faced by an individual. Every one faces challenges in life (professional, societal and domestic) and failure to adapt to them results in perceiving them as threats, which in turn generates pressures. Extreme pressures become stress. When stress surpasses ability to handle, it becomes a threat to both physical and emotional equilibrium, by generating ‘fight-or-flight’ response. 

Military’s highly disciplined, hierarchal and restrictive environment deters giving vent to or sharing pent up frustrations. Howsoever disturbed a soldier may be he has to put up a façade of bravado. Such a situation lends itself to acts of desperation by some over-stressed and distressed soldiers. Increasing cases of indiscipline, suicides and fratricide are symptomatic of the malaise.

By listening to a stressed soldier, a commander provides him an escape valve before the threshold gets crossed. A vigilant and sympathetic commander takes note of the warning signals and activates the preventive mechanism. By listening to a soldier and empathizing with him, a commander assumes the role of a friend, guide and mentor. The soldier feels assured of his commander’s support and feels relieved of the distressing stress. 

Redressal of Grievances

As per the rules, all service personnel are allowed to seek audience with their commanders to apprise them of their complaint and seek redressal. In case not fully satisfied, they can submit written appeals to the Chief (non-statutory complaints) and the Government (statutory complaints). Unfortunately, all complaints get mired in bureaucratic minutiae. No officer has time or the inclination to listen to what the complainant is trying to say. The whole system is totally insensitive. In some cases, complainants retire before their cases are finally disposed off, making the whole exercise meaningless.

Most troops approach their commanders with their grievances through ‘Arzi Reports’ and ‘Sainik Sammelans’. Although these are time tested channels of communication, their effectiveness is directly proportional to the earnestness of the commanders. Troops expect their commanders to listen to them and make a conscious effort to solve their personal, domestic and professional problems. Many grievances get addressed once the commanders listen to the complaints attentively, understand them and explain the facts to the troops, thereby relieving them of their misplaced anxiety. 

Finally

Increasing incidents of collective indiscipline do not portend well for the Indian army; in fact, they are ominous. It appears that the soldiers’ faith in the credibility of the system is beginning to wane. Close to one lakh cases involving service personnel are pending in various courts. It reflects poorly on the Army’s grievance redressal mechanism. Soldiers knock at courts’ doors only when driven to it as a last resort, after losing faith in the sense of justice and the fairness of the system. Equally worrisomely, the Indian Army has been rocked by a large number of suicide and fratricide cases. In most cases, officers’ had failed to take note of the increasing restlessness of the affected soldiers and listen to their murmurs of dissentions.

As stated earlier, one of the primary reasons for the emerging man-management issues is failure of the commanders to listen to their command. Whereas shortage of officers, coupled with overloaded working environment, is certainly a contributory factor, it is more a case of neglecting command responsibilities. It is not sufficient to hear the troops. Commanders must listen to their commands both through verbal communications and non-verbal indications. It is only then that they can initiate corrective measures well in time.*****    

Defence Reforms: Expert Committees or Futile Charades

Defence Reforms: Expert Committees or Futile Charades 

(FORCE September 2013)

Major General Mrinal Suman

Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986 (GNA) is generally considered to be the first step in the currently ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). 

Major blame for the US failure in the Vietnam War was apportioned to segregated planning and operations, resulting in inhibiting the development of a unified war strategy. The catastrophic failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980, the infirmities noticed in the invasion of Grenada in 1983 and inability to respond appropriately when 241 US marines were killed in a terrorist attack in Lebanon convinced all that emergent reforms were needed in the US defence organisation. 

Succumbing to the public outcry, President Ronald Reagan appointed a Blue Ribbon Commission (BRC) on defence management in 1985. It was tasked to examine the complete gamut of management, organisation and decision-making procedures of the Department of Defence and propose changes as required. 

The deliberations of BRC were open to the public. All issues were thoroughly debated in the media. Many members of the strategic community submitted their recommendations. A large number of think tanks were consulted. Goldwater-Nichols Bill was the final result and was debated at length in the Congress as well. President Ronald Reagan signed it in October 1986. The restructuring provided unity of command, unity of effort, integrated planning, shared procurement and a reduction in inter-services rivalry.

The above has been recalled to highlight three important aspects. First, considering it to be a matter of national concern, public participation was welcomed by BRC. Candid and wide-ranging discussions were held with all segments. Concerned citizens and military thinkers took active interest, thereby generating an intense public debate. Secondly, the deliberations were held in an utmost transparent manner. The façade of secrecy was not cunningly used to deny access to the interested participants. Thirdly and most importantly, expert recommendations were accepted by the US Government. Officials were not allowed to appropriate the right to sit in judgment over the recommendations of BRC.  

The Indian Conundrum 

Compare the above with the indifferent handling of the issues concerning reforms in the management of national security in India. The whole country was traumatized when 527 brave Indian soldiers lost their lives and 1363 got wounded due to the treacherous incursion by Pakistan in the Kargil Sector. Although India managed to evict the enemy, failure of intelligence and infirmities of military response exposed major chinks in India’s higher defence management regime.

With a view to reform the national security apparatus, the Government constituted the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) in July 1999 under K Subrahmanyam to review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil Sector; and recommend such measures as considered necessary to guard against such armed intrusions. KRC report was made public after deleting certain portions considered security-sensitive.

In April 2000, a Group of Ministers (GoM) under the Deputy Prime Minister was asked to review the national security system in its entirety with special reference to the recommendations of KRC and formulate specific proposals for implementation. GoM submitted its report in February 2001. Amongst its recommendations, the most critical one pertained to the reorganisation of the higher defence set-up with a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) at the top.

The report was considered by the Cabinet Committee on Security in May 2001. Whereas it accepted other recommendations, the government decided to consult other political parties regarding the creation of the institution of CDS before taking any decision. A rare opportunity to reform the system was lost.  

As all other reforms were to flow from the appointment of CDS, other measures meant little – a white elephant called the Integrated Defence Staff that keeps strutting like a headless chicken; a non-performing Defence Acquisition Wing; and a toothless Defence Intelligence Agency. Thus it was business as usual at MoD.

After losing 10 precious years, a task force was constituted under Naresh Chandra in June 2011 to carry out a review of the progress made and contemporise KRC’s recommendations. The task force included 16 best strategic brains in the country. It submitted its report in mid-2012. Although the report has not been made public as yet, media reports indicate that the recommendations include integration of the services and MoD through cross-postings; reorienting national security strategy from Pakistan to China; and appointment of a permanent Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CCOSC) with a fixed tenure of two years.

Corroborating KRC’s prophetic caution that ‘the political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo’, the government has constituted another committee to analyse the recommendations of the task force. Whereas the task force showed urgency and worked assiduously to submit its report in a year, the government has already wasted much more time in studying it. 

Being the major stakeholder, MoD was also asked to offer its comments. It is learnt that all the key recommendations made by the task force have been opposed by it. MoD feels that the current dispensation is working well and no changes are warranted. 

Futility of Expert Committees

The above state of affairs raises a key issue. Expert committees are constituted to study complex issues that need holistic and multi-dimensional treatment for which the serving officials do not possess required expertise. For that reason, expert committees are invariably broad based and consist of well-known experts in different fields. Being outside the governmental loop, the experts can analyse all inter-related complexities in a non-partisan and objective manner. 

Further, before finalising their recommendations, expert committees hold extensive discussions with the serving officials to understand the challenges faced by them. Due importance is given to their viewpoint. As a matter of fact, all concerned governmental agencies are provided an opportunity to present their perspective and suggestions.

Thus recommendations made by such committees are invariably based on a detailed study of all related imperatives and wide ranging dialogues. Such recommendations cannot be questioned for their objectivity and soundness. Therefore, the government ought to accept the recommendations without any reservations.

Three aspects need to be underlined here. First, expert committees are constituted for well thought-through and holistic specialised guidance. Strangely, instead of accepting their recommendations, the serving officials usurp the right to accept or reject them in the mistaken belief that they know better than the expert committees. If that be so, why have committees in the first place? It is a weird approach and defies logic.

  

Secondly, the whole country has a right to know as to what the recommendations are and the reasons for their rejection. Security of the nation cannot be the exclusive domain of the bureaucrats and the services. Every citizen has a stake in it and has a right to remain informed. Except a handful of highly classified matters most of the issues deserve no security classification and must be discussed publically in an open and transparent manner.

Finally and most importantly, comments of all entities must be made public. Citizens must know as to who is opposing reforms and the reasons thereof. Although, broad contours of the Kargil Committee Report and the Naresh Chandra Task Force are available in the public domain, rationale offered by the opponents is not known. As resistance to CDS/CCOSC is symptomatic of the malaise of stalling reforms suggested by various expert committees, the issue deserves a closer look.

Opposition to the Key Reform

Not a soul in his wisdom can question the need for jointness in military operations. Jointness means conducting integrated military operations with common strategy, methodology and conduct. It entails evolution of joint equipment policy and acquisition plans; joint planning, development of doctrine and policy-making; joint training; integrated preparation of budget and monitoring of expenditure; and joint operational commands and staff structures.

Achievement of total synergy amongst the three services is the ultimate aim of RMA and it cannot be achieved without having a joint hierarchy with a single point military advice at the pinnacle. Therefore, appointment of a principal military adviser to the government is the key reform in whose absence all other measures are infructuous. Sadly, it remains stalled.

The Naresh Chandra Task Force tried to mollify opponents of KRC’s proposed CDS by proposing creation of a permanent CCOSC, a much watered down arrangement. MoD has reportedly rejected it as well. It has cited lack of consensus amongst the services as the main reason. For MoD, it is a highly comforting situation. It wants the country to believe that it is pro-reforms but cannot take a decision unless all the three services are on board. 

The countrymen are perplexed and want to know as to which service is opposing reforms and what are the reasons advanced for its antagonism. They want to judge as to how compelling their reasoning is. In addition, inaction by MoD by blaming lack of consensus is not considered acceptable. The countrymen want to be apprised of MoD’s stand about suggested reforms and reasons for its reluctance to enforce them.  

Media reports indicate that whereas the Navy supports creation of permanent CCOSC, the Army and the Air are against the proposal. The role of the Air Force has always been obstructionist. It blocked creation of CDS in 2002-03 and now it is opposing permanent CCOSC. In informal conversations, most Air Force commanders agree that no future war can ever be won without total jointmanship. They also concede that for true synergy, directions must flow down from a unified command. Yet, reforms are opposed on specious grounds. It is a highly intriguing and paradoxical situation. 

For opposing reforms recommended by the expert committees, the Army and the Air Force are being seen as selfish and parochial entities by the countrymen. It is felt that the appointment of permanent CCOSC is opposed by the service chiefs who are worried that they would become a lesser personage. Both the services need to redeem their standing through an open debate and convincing the countrymen of the soundness of their opposition. 

As regards MoD, it hides its own opposition to the reforms by putting all the blame on the services. It is no secret that MoD bureaucrats prefer status quo. They are wary that a permanent CCOSC would diminish the role of the Defence Secretary as the final arbiter of inter-services disagreements. Further, under the present dispensation, the Defence Secretary acts as the single point advisor to the Defence Minister. Permanent CCOSC is perceived as a threat to his position of pre-eminence.  

Finally  

In its report of 2008-09, Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence expressed concern over the lack of progress in the creation of the post of CDS to boost synergy among the three services and recommended early decision-making by the Government. Instead of giving any reasons for delay or commitment for implementation, MoD expressed satisfaction at the progress being made by terming reforms to be an ‘incremental process’. If that be so, where was the need to constitute Naresh Chandra Task Force? Was it a farcical charade?

Undoubtedly, consensus is the most preferred option and public pressure can play a constructive role in achieving that. Therefore, it is essential that the recommendations of the Kargil Committee and the Naresh Chandra Task Force be made public. Thereafter, viewpoints of supporters and opponents along with detailed justification should be debated in open. All citizens have a stake in national security and deserve to know as to why some entities are opposing reforms. 

India must learn from the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. There are times in the life of a nation when hard decisions are required to be taken by the leadership. The current inter-services quibbling must not be allowed to continue. National security is too serious a matter to be permitted to be held hostage to the egocentric chiefs. Dissenting and obstructionist commanders should be treated as anti-national elements. It is essential to identify and shame them. All this can be achieved only through an open and transparent debate – fear of exposure will deter selfish elements from acting as impediments.*****

The untapped potential of India’s SMEs in defence production

The untapped potential of India’s SMEs in defence production

Major General Mrinal Suman

Innovation implies sustained generation of newer ideas, views, concepts and solutions. The basic tenet of the term innovation means ‘doing things in a newer and better way’, with a view to improve upon the existing products and processes. Innovation is considered to be a dynamic catalyst to growth. Any country that fails to develop and sustain a culture of innovation is bound to become a straggler.

It is also a well recognised fact that almost all innovations are carried out by small and medium enterprises (SMEs). They are rightly called ‘the engines that spearhead technological advancement’. All developed nations owe their growth to their highly developed SMEs. Governments provide support to their SMEs to help them retain their technological lead through continuous innovations. The importance of SMEs in the defence sector gets further enhanced due to the fact that defence industry is highly technology-intensive and needs continuous upgradation of defence systems through regular infusion of innovative skills and knowledge.

In its white paper on Defence Industrial Strategy of 2005, the UK underlined the decisive role played by SMEs in producing cutting-edge technologies in critical areas and promised enhanced governmental assistance. Effective utilisation of potential and innovation of SMEs was considered to be the key factor by the European Commission for the success of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. Seven conferences were held in different member states between October 2009 and March 2010 to study ‘Competitiveness of European SMEs in the Defence Sector’ and to explore concrete ways to support them. 

Strength of SMEs

Compared to large companies, SMEs enjoy a number of significant advantages. As they operate in niche segments, they master manufacturing processes, acquire specialised knowledge and achieve exceptional expertise. Resultantly, they attain unique innovative and inventive capabilities. Credit for most cutting-edge break-throughs in precision machining, electronics and nano technologies goes to SMEs.

Being small and focused players, they possess greater flexibility and speed. They can learn and absorb new technologies more efficiently. Due to limited administrative expenses, they have lower overhead costs. Once they establish their credentials in a supply chain, they win the confidence of their customers and move up the technology ladder. Thus the cycle continues.

All major defence contractors are integrators who procure sub-assemblies and sub-systems from SMEs to configure defence systems as per the required performance parameters prescribed by the buyers. Supplies by SMEs can be of the items which are manufactured by them as per the engineering documentation provided by the contractor; items whose development and manufacture is sub-contracted by the contractor to SMEs based on his procurement drawings/specifications; and items sourced by contractor against his procurement specifications as ‘fully finished’,  with IPR resting with the SME concerned.

Challenges Faced by SMEs

SMEs are small players with limited resources and cannot compete on their own. Defence business is characterised by long and complex procurement procedures. In the case of developmental contracts, time lag between R&D and returns can be excessively long. Due to the uncertainties of defence business, many SMEs find investment risks to be dissuasive. While venture capital is not easily available, banks are reluctant to lend. Resultantly, SMEs lack adequate financial endurance for long term sustainment.

Being deficient of adequate resources, most SMEs fail to gather timely information about future capability requirements and perspective plans. Consequently, they are unable to do advance planning for impending business opportunities. They know little about the business opportunities available in the foreign markets. At times, due to the lack of adequate visibility, they get overlooked by default.

As the government is the main and even sole customer of their products, subsequent variation in budgetary allocations or change of priorities of procurement proposals can adversely affect flow of orders after the creation of necessary facilities. For SMEs operating in niche segments, economies of scale is a matter of serious concern.

Abysmal Neglect of Indian SMEs

India has failed to recognise the potential of SMEs in defence production. It has neither provided facilitative environment to them nor tapped their huge technological prowess. Neglect of SMEs has resulted in our failure to create, stimulate and nurture an environment of innovations in the Indian defence industry. It is one of the primary reasons for the dismal state of India’s defence industry – more than 70 percent of defence requirements have to be imported even after six decades of independence.

Although SMEs have been supplying sub-assemblies and components to the public sector entities for decades, they continue to be peripheral players and produce low-tech items. Their technological competence has not kept pace as they have never been encouraged to invest in developing newer products or carrying out pioneering innovations. Resultantly, very few SMEs have acquired competence to develop, manufacture and upgrade defence systems.

Ministry of Defence (MoD) carries out capital procurements as per the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and revenue procurements as per the provision of the Defence Procurement Manual (DPM). Whereas DPP focuses only on major contractors and system integrators, DPM lists 358 items that have been reserved for SMEs and micro enterprises. The list is common to all government procurements and has no specific application for defence.

The reserved items are low-tech mundane products like agricultural implements, nuts/bolts/brushes, hosiery products, handicrafts and tradesmen tools. The list is also a reflection of the fact that the Government considers SMEs to be fit for commonplace products only. It does not recognise their potential for technology upgradation and innovation.

The much awaited Defence Production Policy was released on 13 January 2011. It assigned the role of indigenisation (import substitution or duplicating imported components) to SMEs. Once again, it showed Government’s lack of faith in the capabilities of SMEs to develop and master high-end technologies. That has been the bane of SMEs in India. 

 

Interestingly, the Defence Production Policy promised to ‘set up a separate fund to provide necessary resources to public/private sector including SMEs as well as academic and scientific institutions to support R&D of defence equipment/systems enhancing cutting edge technology’. As is the Government’s wont, three years have passed and the promised fund is yet to be set up. 

According to DPP-2013, Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) has decided to set aside an amount of Rs 500 crore for providing loans. Further, a fund of Rs. 50 crore out of ‘India Opportunities Fund’ (managed by its subsidiary SIDBI Venture Capital Ltd) has been earmarked for equity support. Thus regular supply of funds to SMEs involved in the manufacture of defence products has been promised. However, SMEs are cautiously optimistic as there is a huge gap between promises and implementations.

Business Opportunities for Indian SMEs in the Defence Sector

Although enormous opportunities exist for SMEs in the Indian defence sector, they need support and encouragement to thrive and deliver. For major acquisitions, SMEs can become sub-vendors to prime contractors for the supply of sub-assemblies and components. They can supply items which are developed in-house by them. Or else, items can be manufactured as per the specifications and designs supplied by the buying contractor. 

Vast opportunities for the development and manufacture of niche items to fight asymmetrical wars, terrorism and insurgency have emerged. Demand for explosive detectors, scanners, IED suppressers, bomb disposal equipment, bullet proof jackets and such items has increased multifold. Such items can be best produced by SMEs.

India is undertaking many large-scale and multi-dimensional projects like F-INSAS (Future Infantry Soldier as a System), Network Centric Warfare and Tactical Communication System. SMEs can gainfully join hands with other companies to excel in the areas of their expertise.

Nearly 50 percent of the defence equipment held by the Indian armed forces is close to becoming obsolescent and needs upgradation for the extension of its useful life. It is estimated that business opportunities worth USD 10 billion exist in this segment. As such programmes entail multiple technologies; SMEs can profitably participate in them.

With India preferring ‘Buy (Indian)’, ‘Buy and Make (Indian)’ and “Make’ routes for defence procurements, Indian companies will have to assume the role of systems integrators. They will need to source required components, sub-assemblies and sub-systems from Indian vendors to meet stipulations of indigenous content. As the world trade is heading towards the ‘Global Village’ concept, highly competitive SMEs can establish themselves in worldwide supply chains by exploiting their specialised knowledge and skills.

Maintenance of imported equipment also throws up huge opportunities for SMEs as foreign suppliers find it more beneficial to have competent Indian partners to provide maintenance support. India has a huge inventory of expensive imported equipment that requires regular backup support to include periodic maintenance, repairs and overhaul. It is likely to generate business worth USD 1.2 billion over the next 10 years.

Similarly, in order to fulfill offset obligations worth billions of dollars, foreign suppliers will need to partner not only the large Indian companies but also efficient SMEs. It is for the enterprising SMEs to position themselves accordingly. The Defence Offset Policy allows a multiplier of 1.5 in case foreign vendors choose SMEs as their Indian offset partners. 

Homeland security is another area where defence SMEs can prosper. Unfortunately, inadequate attention is being paid to the fact that a large number of items are common to both the armed forces and the internal security organisations. They include weapons and protection systems, both for individuals and vehicles; communications, data transmission systems and mobile command & control equipment; explosive sensors and disposal equipment; early warning security and surveillance systems; radio interceptors and jammers; decontamination systems; and simulators for training. Most items are produced by SMEs.

The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is responsible for India’s internal security and has a number of central police forces under it for special tasks and to supplement states’ resources. As maintenance of law and order is a state subject, all states maintain considerable police, armed police and special police forces. India has 28 states and 7 Union Territories. Provisioning and procurement of all items for the modernisation of central police forces is handled by the Police Modernisation Division (PMD) of MHA. PMD also assists and oversees modernisation of state police forces, although most of the procurements are carried out by the state governments. 

According to reports appearing in the press, the Union Government is likely to spend over USD 7.5 billion and state governments close to USD 2 billion on the modernisation of their police organisations in the near future. Commonality of equipment held by the defence forces and the internal security organisations will ensure continuous flow of orders to SMEs and help them to achieve economies of scale.

The Way Forward 

India needs to improve the competitiveness of its SMEs and enhance their role in the Indian defence industry. A supportive and facilitative environment is essential for tapping the enormous potential of SMEs.  Dynamics of defence industry pose atypical challenges to their sustenance and growth. To surmount them, regular interaction is necessary between different stake holders for bridging the existing communication gap and speedy evaluation of newer ideas and their optimum exploitation through appropriate adoption. 

To start with, the Government should evolve a national policy to nurture and protect SMEs in the defence sector with time-bound action plan. SMEs must be assured of continuity of policy; fairness and transparency of evaluation process; and probity of the whole environment.

The long promised special fund should be set up to provide financial support to deserving SMEs. In times of financial crisis, they should be helped through painless financing instruments. Information regarding future capability requirements and impending tenders should be disseminated through fortnightly electronic bulletins, as is done in many countries. A data base should be prepared of all SMEs in the defence sector with their capabilities duly highlighted. Defence Offsets Management Wing should have a section exclusively to help SMEs with offset opportunities. 

SMEs often complain that their interests are being neglected by their trade/industrial associations as these have been hijacked to serve the interests of a few aggressive big players. As SMEs lack resources to be able to compete on their own, collective assertion is essential. They should organise themselves into focused associations and clusters. It will help them to pool their resources to reduce overheads and increase R&D spending to move up the technology ladder. SMEs should improve their visibility and position themselves in niche areas of their specialised knowledge and skills.

Finally and most importantly, it is for SMEs have to be capability driven, competent and competitive. They have to establish their credibility for performance, quality assurance and timely supplies. Hand-holding by the Government cannot be a substitute for commitment to excel. No external support can sustain SMEs that fail to innovate continuously to improve their niche expertise. Competition is tough and defence technology becomes obsolescent rapidly. As is commonly said – ‘there is no place for laggards in the defence business’.*****