Tactical Communication System: A Victim of Bureaucratic Vacillation

Tactical Communication System: A Victim of Bureaucratic Vacillation

Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM, PhD

As per the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), there are three basic routes to acquire defence equipment – outright purchase of the whole quantity; indigenous development; and outright purchase of part quantity followed by local production of the balance requirement under licence.

On receipt of a procurement proposal from a Service Headquarters (SHQ), Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) constitutes categorisation committees to study the proposal and recommend methodology for the procurement of the required equipment. A number of factors like degree of urgency, total requirement, existence of indigenous production capability and R&D competence to develop the item within the required timelines are considered. Thereafter, the case is discussed in the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) where categorisation is finally approved.

Categorisation is the most critical decision as it specifies the route to be followed. Faulty selection of route can adversely impact timely procurement of equipment, forcing DAC to change the category midway. It implies abandonment of all the progress made and starting the whole process ab initio as per the new procurement route with resultant time and cost overruns.

Tactical Communication System: A Saga of Indecisiveness

It was in 1996 that the Army Headquarters (AHQ) projected a requirement to replace the outdated Army Radio Engineering Network (AREN) system to handle communication requirements (voice, data and video) of a field force in the Tactical Battle Area. Accordingly, a proposal to acquire Tactical Communication System (TCS) was initiated, with its urgency and criticality duly highlighted.

TCS is a wide area network that is deployed to provide secure communications infrastructure and network enabled operating environment to tactical forces in a corps zone. TCS is a force multiplier. Mobility and speedy deployability are its essential features as it has to keep pace with the fluidity of developing war space. Communication security, seamless interoperability and high network survivability through multiple links are the other salient features.

Unfortunately, the proposal soon got mired in normal bureaucratic vacillation. To start with, it was directed that the case for TCS be taken up as an upgrade of AREN. AHQ prepared and processed the case accordingly. For five years, the case-file kept shuttling between different offices. A number of questions were raised and answered but no headway was made.

After wasting half a decade, it dawned on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that the scope of TCS was too large to be treated as an upgrade case. Accordingly in 2001, MoD directed that the upgrade case be withdrawn and a fresh procurement proposal be initiated.

As directed, AHQ initiated a fresh procurement proposal. Acceptance of Necessity was granted in the due course under the provisions of the newly introduced DPP-2002. However, the case was categorised as a hybrid of ‘Buy and Make’ and ‘Make’. TCS as a whole was to be treated as a ‘Buy and Make’ case – first two systems were to be imported and the balance manufactured in India with imported technology. However, development of secrecy and Network Management System was to be carried out by Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) as part of ‘Make’ portion of categorisation.

Consequent to the acceptance of the report of the Kelkar Committee, the Government introduced a new category for procurements through indigenous development in 2006. Under DPP-2006, all indigenous R&D projects are required to be sub-categorised as follows:-

· ‘Make (Strategic, Complex and Security Sensitive Systems)’ – projects involving development of critical and security sensitive technologies leading to next generation weapon systems and platforms to be assigned to DRDO.

· ‘Make (Low-Tech Mature Systems)’ – to be treated as ‘Buy Indian’ cases with minimum 50 per cent indigenous content.

· ‘Make (High-Tech Systems)’ – to be based on proven or matured technologies where fundamental research is not required. Both public sector undertakings and private sector companies are eligible to participate with MoD sharing developmental costs.

In view of the introduction of the above mentioned sub-categorisation, it was decided to review the route to be followed for TCS once again. After due deliberations, DAC decided to recategorised TCS proposal as ‘Make (Hi-Tech)’ case in November 2007. Resultantly, the whole process had to be started afresh once again.

Unfairly, an unheard of category ‘Make (by DPSU)’ was ingeniously invented and applied to TCS to keep the private sector out. MoD peremptorily nominated Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), a defence public sector undertaking, to be the sole design and production agency. The private sector was aghast at this display of open partisanship and sought intervention of the top leadership for a fair chance to compete. MoD had to rescind its decision.

Apprehending threat to the monopoly of BEL from a more efficient private sector, the Department of Defence Production (DDP) expressed doubts about the competence of the private sector. It suggested constitution of a committee to carry out market feasibility studies. It was a totally unjustified and infructuous demand – under the provisions of DPP, a duly constituted Integrated Project Management Team (IPMT) under the Acquisition Wing is mandated to carry out the task of vendor appraisal.

Nevertheless, under pressure from DDP, a multi-disciplinary committee was constituted on 22 January 2009 with a representative of DDP as a member. The committee deliberated upon the presentations made by both the public and the private sectors. To validate their claims, it visited select companies as well. It concluded that both the sectors possessed competence to handle TCS.

Having failed in its attempts to eliminate the private sector through the committee, BEL managed to have a letter issued by the Deputy National Security Advisor stressing the need to ensure security of communications. It promptly exploited the letter to claim that the private sector could not be co-opted in TCS due to secrecy concerns. It started advocating re-categorisation of the project as ‘Make (Strategic, Complex and Security Sensitive Systems)’ to ensure that DRDO-BEL combine got the project.

Raising the bogey of secrecy is an old and time-tested stratagem of DDP to keep private sector at bay. BEL cleverly hid the fact that secrecy aspects are limited to the ‘hopping algorithm’ contained in a microchip that costs less than Rs 40,000, whereas the estimated value of the whole project is expected to exceed Rs 10,000 crores.

The private sector smelt a rat. It recalled that even in 2003 when the project was made a hybrid of ‘Buy and Make’ and ‘Make’, secrecy issues were to be handled by DRDO under the ‘Make’ part. Hence, it suggested that ‘hopping algorithm’ be kept reserved for government agencies and the rest of TCS project be thrown open to competition.

After employing numerous delaying tactics and testing the patience of the Army, DDP realised that DAC had made up its mind to allow both public and private sectors to participate in bidding for TCS. Ultimately, BEL had to reconcile to competition. IPMT for TCS was convened under the Acquisition Wing in September 2009. It formulated Project Definition Document (PDD) to define and develop system requirements. Thereafter, IPMT invited E of I from all empanelled companies. A number of public and private sector entities responded, some in their individual capacity and some after forming consortia.

IPMT made a detailed assessment of design and manufacturing capabilities of all the industries/consortia, with special reference to the critical technology areas. It has since submitted its recommendations to the Acquisition Wing. BEL and a consortium led by L&T (with HCL and Tata Power as other members) are learnt to be the front runners.

Once the results of the final selection by the Defence Production Board are announced, both the short listed companies would be asked to prepare Detailed Project Reports (DPR). IPMT would assist them. DPR would stipulate scope of work, development phases and time schedules. After analysis, IPMT would progress the case to the Acquisition Wing for obtaining financial approval of the Competent Financial Authority.

It may take quite some time before the contract is finally awarded to the successful vendors. As BEL abhors competition and wants the project through nomination route, one is not sure as to what new tricks it has up its sleeves. Unfortunately, it is the Army that is suffering due to the ongoing turf war. Nearly 16 years have elapsed since the projection of TCS in 1996. India is still to take the first step and TCS remains a distant dream for the present.