Tactical Communication System: A Victim of Bureaucratic Vacillation

Tactical Communication System: A Victim of Bureaucratic Vacillation

Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM, PhD

As per the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), there are three basic routes to acquire defence equipment – outright purchase of the whole quantity; indigenous development; and outright purchase of part quantity followed by local production of the balance requirement under licence.

On receipt of a procurement proposal from a Service Headquarters (SHQ), Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS) constitutes categorisation committees to study the proposal and recommend methodology for the procurement of the required equipment. A number of factors like degree of urgency, total requirement, existence of indigenous production capability and R&D competence to develop the item within the required timelines are considered. Thereafter, the case is discussed in the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) where categorisation is finally approved.

Categorisation is the most critical decision as it specifies the route to be followed. Faulty selection of route can adversely impact timely procurement of equipment, forcing DAC to change the category midway. It implies abandonment of all the progress made and starting the whole process ab initio as per the new procurement route with resultant time and cost overruns.

Tactical Communication System: A Saga of Indecisiveness

It was in 1996 that the Army Headquarters (AHQ) projected a requirement to replace the outdated Army Radio Engineering Network (AREN) system to handle communication requirements (voice, data and video) of a field force in the Tactical Battle Area. Accordingly, a proposal to acquire Tactical Communication System (TCS) was initiated, with its urgency and criticality duly highlighted.

TCS is a wide area network that is deployed to provide secure communications infrastructure and network enabled operating environment to tactical forces in a corps zone. TCS is a force multiplier. Mobility and speedy deployability are its essential features as it has to keep pace with the fluidity of developing war space. Communication security, seamless interoperability and high network survivability through multiple links are the other salient features.

Unfortunately, the proposal soon got mired in normal bureaucratic vacillation. To start with, it was directed that the case for TCS be taken up as an upgrade of AREN. AHQ prepared and processed the case accordingly. For five years, the case-file kept shuttling between different offices. A number of questions were raised and answered but no headway was made.

After wasting half a decade, it dawned on the Ministry of Defence (MoD) that the scope of TCS was too large to be treated as an upgrade case. Accordingly in 2001, MoD directed that the upgrade case be withdrawn and a fresh procurement proposal be initiated.

As directed, AHQ initiated a fresh procurement proposal. Acceptance of Necessity was granted in the due course under the provisions of the newly introduced DPP-2002. However, the case was categorised as a hybrid of ‘Buy and Make’ and ‘Make’. TCS as a whole was to be treated as a ‘Buy and Make’ case – first two systems were to be imported and the balance manufactured in India with imported technology. However, development of secrecy and Network Management System was to be carried out by Defence R&D Organisation (DRDO) as part of ‘Make’ portion of categorisation.

Consequent to the acceptance of the report of the Kelkar Committee, the Government introduced a new category for procurements through indigenous development in 2006. Under DPP-2006, all indigenous R&D projects are required to be sub-categorised as follows:-

· ‘Make (Strategic, Complex and Security Sensitive Systems)’ – projects involving development of critical and security sensitive technologies leading to next generation weapon systems and platforms to be assigned to DRDO.

· ‘Make (Low-Tech Mature Systems)’ – to be treated as ‘Buy Indian’ cases with minimum 50 per cent indigenous content.

· ‘Make (High-Tech Systems)’ – to be based on proven or matured technologies where fundamental research is not required. Both public sector undertakings and private sector companies are eligible to participate with MoD sharing developmental costs.

In view of the introduction of the above mentioned sub-categorisation, it was decided to review the route to be followed for TCS once again. After due deliberations, DAC decided to recategorised TCS proposal as ‘Make (Hi-Tech)’ case in November 2007. Resultantly, the whole process had to be started afresh once again.

Unfairly, an unheard of category ‘Make (by DPSU)’ was ingeniously invented and applied to TCS to keep the private sector out. MoD peremptorily nominated Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL), a defence public sector undertaking, to be the sole design and production agency. The private sector was aghast at this display of open partisanship and sought intervention of the top leadership for a fair chance to compete. MoD had to rescind its decision.

Apprehending threat to the monopoly of BEL from a more efficient private sector, the Department of Defence Production (DDP) expressed doubts about the competence of the private sector. It suggested constitution of a committee to carry out market feasibility studies. It was a totally unjustified and infructuous demand – under the provisions of DPP, a duly constituted Integrated Project Management Team (IPMT) under the Acquisition Wing is mandated to carry out the task of vendor appraisal.

Nevertheless, under pressure from DDP, a multi-disciplinary committee was constituted on 22 January 2009 with a representative of DDP as a member. The committee deliberated upon the presentations made by both the public and the private sectors. To validate their claims, it visited select companies as well. It concluded that both the sectors possessed competence to handle TCS.

Having failed in its attempts to eliminate the private sector through the committee, BEL managed to have a letter issued by the Deputy National Security Advisor stressing the need to ensure security of communications. It promptly exploited the letter to claim that the private sector could not be co-opted in TCS due to secrecy concerns. It started advocating re-categorisation of the project as ‘Make (Strategic, Complex and Security Sensitive Systems)’ to ensure that DRDO-BEL combine got the project.

Raising the bogey of secrecy is an old and time-tested stratagem of DDP to keep private sector at bay. BEL cleverly hid the fact that secrecy aspects are limited to the ‘hopping algorithm’ contained in a microchip that costs less than Rs 40,000, whereas the estimated value of the whole project is expected to exceed Rs 10,000 crores.

The private sector smelt a rat. It recalled that even in 2003 when the project was made a hybrid of ‘Buy and Make’ and ‘Make’, secrecy issues were to be handled by DRDO under the ‘Make’ part. Hence, it suggested that ‘hopping algorithm’ be kept reserved for government agencies and the rest of TCS project be thrown open to competition.

After employing numerous delaying tactics and testing the patience of the Army, DDP realised that DAC had made up its mind to allow both public and private sectors to participate in bidding for TCS. Ultimately, BEL had to reconcile to competition. IPMT for TCS was convened under the Acquisition Wing in September 2009. It formulated Project Definition Document (PDD) to define and develop system requirements. Thereafter, IPMT invited E of I from all empanelled companies. A number of public and private sector entities responded, some in their individual capacity and some after forming consortia.

IPMT made a detailed assessment of design and manufacturing capabilities of all the industries/consortia, with special reference to the critical technology areas. It has since submitted its recommendations to the Acquisition Wing. BEL and a consortium led by L&T (with HCL and Tata Power as other members) are learnt to be the front runners.

Once the results of the final selection by the Defence Production Board are announced, both the short listed companies would be asked to prepare Detailed Project Reports (DPR). IPMT would assist them. DPR would stipulate scope of work, development phases and time schedules. After analysis, IPMT would progress the case to the Acquisition Wing for obtaining financial approval of the Competent Financial Authority.

It may take quite some time before the contract is finally awarded to the successful vendors. As BEL abhors competition and wants the project through nomination route, one is not sure as to what new tricks it has up its sleeves. Unfortunately, it is the Army that is suffering due to the ongoing turf war. Nearly 16 years have elapsed since the projection of TCS in 1996. India is still to take the first step and TCS remains a distant dream for the present.

Need for Transparency in Offsets

Need for Transparency in Offsets

Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM, PhD

Although offsets in Indian defence deals were introduced in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) of 2005, secrecy continues to shroud the complete gamut of offset related activities. Reportedly, India has signed offset contracts worth over Rs 14,000 crores to date. That is the only figure available in public domain. Nothing is known about the progress made by different offset programmes so far. No one knows if any offset contract has been successfully implemented and closed. Transparency is conspicuous by its total absence.

One of the biggest weaknesses of offsets is their vulnerability to corrupt practices. According to Transparency International, access to offsets arrangements distributed by officials can become more lucrative than competitive activities, creating an incentive for networks of corruption to proliferate around them. Thus, introduction of offsets has increased the risks of corrupt practices in defence business considerably.

Indian defence procurement regime remains mired in controversies and is struggling to acquire credibility. It will be a terrible setback in case mismanaged offset programmes add to the existing woe and despair. As secrecy breeds corruption, the best safeguard against wrongdoings is to make public details of all offset related developments, contracts signed and their progress on ground. As will be seen, transparency is the most effective preventive precaution against dishonest practices.

Misplaced Concerns for Security

As offset contracts are related to main defence contracts, they are, most unjustifiably, accorded the same security classification as the main contracts.

Foreign vendors are allowed to fulfill their offsets obligations through any of the following routes:-

a) Direct purchase of or executing export orders for eligible products and services provided by Indian defence industries.

b) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Indian industries for industrial infrastructure for services, co-development, joint ventures and co-production of eligible products and components.

c) FDI in Indian organisations engaged in research in R&D as certified by Defence Offset Facilitation Agency (DOFA).

Products eligible for discharge of offsets relate to defence, internal security and civil aerospace. ‘Services’ mean maintenance, overhaul, upgradation, life extension, engineering, design, testing of eligible products and related software or quality assurance services with reference to the indicated eligible products and training. Training includes training services and training equipment but excludes civil infrastructure.

Due to dissuasive policy of capping FDI in defence sector at 26 percent, foreign vendors are reluctant to invest in Indian ventures as they enjoy no controlling power. Thus, direct purchase of eligible products and services is the sole viable option available to foreign vendors for the fulfillment of their offset obligations.

A list of eligible products and services has been given in DPP. Even a cursory glance will show that no item is of any security concern. In any case, India produces no high-tech equipment of exclusive know-how. Foreign vendors are procuring low-end sub-assemblies and components from India to fulfill their obligations. In certain cases, some mundane items are being manufactured in India as per the designs supplied by foreign companies – HAL is supplying doors and windows of aircraft to foreign majors. Even services being exported are of rudimentary maintenance tasks. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination can offset activities be construed to be of security concerns.

Secrecy Spawns Corruption

As stated earlier, the biggest weakness that offsets suffer from is that their opacity provides an ideal playground for corruption. Therefore, dishonest officials considered it prudent to keep offset contracts outside public oversight. Three factors help them in their devious endeavour. One, as the focus always remains on main contracts, offset contracts attract peripheral public interest. Two, due to their long-term spread, both public and media lose interest in them. Three, appraisal, evaluation and efficacy-ascertainment of offset programmes is a highly complex task; and there are no standard tools available for the purpose.

Therefore, very little information about offsets is made public. Resultant lack of media attention allows unscrupulous players to tweak the system ingeniously to derive undue advantages. Although there are numerous possibilities for illegal gratifications in the complete gamut of offset activities, there are three common practices that are often resorted to.

One, exports in lieu of offset obligations are over-invoiced by dishonest Indian partners to inflate value of offset credits. Two, routine commercial/trading activities are claimed as offset programmes to earn credits, thereby denying genuine benefits to the country. Finally, obliging officials allow re-phasing of the offset schedules of erring vendors even beyond the period of the main contract for illegal gratifications on quid pro quo basis. Penalties are unfairly waived by declaring the requests for rescheduling to be justified.

Transparency Promotes Compliance

Public awareness of offset contracts and their progress act as the greatest deterrent for insincere foreign vendors. Most foreign vendors are big defence conglomerate and are very sensitive to adverse media publicity. They are extremely wary of loss of reputation and credibility. Any news about their failure to adhere to offset schedules can dent their world-wide standing and expose them as insincere and inefficient vendors who default on their contractual commitments.

In case they indulge in fraudulent activities, public pressure can force the officials to take punitive action against them – from financial penalties to blacklisting. Any company found guilty in India of corrupt practices renders itself liable for legal action in their own countries as well where anti-corruption laws are far stricter. Foreign vendors dread such a development and would do their best to fulfill their offset obligations as contracted. Thus, transparency and associated public scrutiny will force them to deliver and deter them from transgressions.

Conclusion

India is expecting an inflow of offsets worth USD 36 billion in the next few years. It is an enormous amount by all standards and cannot be consigned to peripheral importance. It deserves close public oversight and regular media scrutiny.

MoD should issue a Quarterly Offset Bulletin (QOB), both in print and electronic forms. In addition to containing information about latest changes in offset policies and amplification of imprecise provisions, QOB should make the following information public:-

• Details of offset contracts signed during the period of coverage with details of their total offset value; breakdown of constituent offset programmes with their respective objectives and value; details of Indian partners; and agreed implementation schedule with major milestones.
• Implementation progress of all offset programmes with details of slippages and reasons thereof; action taken to put the programmes on track; penalties imposed and recovered from defaulting vendors; and permission granted to foreign vendors to change Indian partners for non-performance.
• Particulars of offset contracts duly completed with details of their scheduled progress; performance audit by an independent agency to validate claims; and degree to which programmes were successful in achieving planned objectives.
• Feedback received and lessons learnt for further streamlining of the process.
  

Secrecy is the antithesis of transparency and encourages proliferation of corrupt practices. Under the garb of security concerns, very little information is made public, thereby keeping the whole process under wraps. Thus, a culture of non-accountability thrives under the garb of security considerations. As stated above, offsets warrant no secrecy whatsoever. Details of every single aspect of offset contracts and their implementation should be disseminated to the public. Transparency is the best antidote for the virus of corruption and misconduct.

SMEs in Defence Production: Opportunities and Challenges

SMEs in Defence Production: Opportunities and Challenges

Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM, PhD

Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are universally accepted as engines that drive technological progress in all industrial sectors. Their importance in the defence sector gets further enhanced due to the fact that defence industry is highly technology-intensive.

Importance of SMEs can be gauged from the fact that every technologically advanced nation has accorded due recognition to their promotion. The UK Defence Industrial Strategy, published as a white paper in December 2005, seeks to drive innovations by promoting greater interaction and collaboration between the government, prime contractors and SMEs. UK’s Defence Supply Network Policy also recognises the contribution of SMEs towards the supply-networks to deliver value for money, agility and innovation.

Acknowledging the criticality of the role of SMEs in the European Defence Technological & Industrial Base (EDTIB), the European Commission adopted the Defence Package which, inter alia, contains numerous proposals for the support of SMEs. Effective utilisation of potential and innovation of SMEs was considered to be the key factor for the success of EDTIB. In follow-up to the Defence Package, seven conferences were held in different member states between October 2009 and March 2010 to study “Competitiveness of European SMEs in the Defense Sector” and to explore concrete ways to support them.

SMEs in Indian Defence Sector

Not enough attention has been paid to the promotion of SMEs in the Indian defence industry. Although they have been supplying sub-assemblies and components to public sector undertakings for decades, their technological competence has not kept pace. They continue to be peripheral players and produce low-tech items. They have never been encouraged to invest in developing new products or carrying out pioneering innovations. Resultantly, very few SMEs have acquired competence to develop, manufacture and upgrade defence systems.

Ministry of Defence (MoD) carries out capital procurements as per the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) and revenue procurements as per the provision of Defence Procurement Manual (DPM). DPP does not contain a word about the SMEs. As a matter of fact it completely ignores their existence and focuses only on major contractors and system integrators.

As regards DPM, 358 items have been reserved for SMEs and micro enterprises. The list is common to all government procurements and has no specific application for defence. The items are low-tech mundane products like agricultural implements, nuts/bolts/brushes, hosiery products, handicrafts and tradesmen tools. The list is also a reflection of the fact that MoD considers SMEs to be fit for commonplace products only. It does not recognise their potential for technology upgradation and innovation.

Incidentally, DPM exempts SMEs from the payment of earnest money and performance security deposit. They can also be allowed price preference of up to 15 percent in comparison to large industries, provided such a clause is mentioned upfront in the tender documents.

The much awaited Defence Production Policy was released on 13 January 2011. It turned out to be damp squib. In the absence of any radical policy initiative, the policy acquired the character of a statement of intent and not a plan of action. Whereas SMEs were hopeful of getting major incentives, they had to be satisfied with the fact that ‘enhancement of the potential of SMEs in indigenisation’ found mention in the objectives of the policy. Unfortunately, the above statement is indicative of Government’s lack of faith in the capabilities of SMEs to innovate. Only the task of indigenisation (import substitution or duplicating imported components) has been assigned to them. That has been the bane of SMEs in India.

The Defence Production Policy promised to ‘set up a separate fund to provide necessary resources to public/private sector including SMEs as well as academic and scientific institutions to support R&D of defence equipment/systems enhancing cutting edge technology’. As is the Government’s wont, one year has passed and the promised fund is yet to be set up.

Strengths

As stated earlier, SMEs have been in the forefront of technological advancement the world over. Large companies incorporate sub-systems developed by SMEs to configure defence equipment for required performance. Some major areas of strength of SMEs are as follows:-

a) As they operate in niche segments, they master manufacturing processes, acquire specialised knowledge and achieve exceptional expertise. Resultantly, they attain unique innovative and inventive capabilities. Credit for most cutting-edge break-throughs in precision machining, electronics and nano technologies goes to SMEs.

b) Being small and focused players, they possess greater flexibility and speed. They can learn and absorb new technologies more efficiently.

c) Due to limited administrative expenses, they have lower overhead costs.

d) Once they establish their credentials in a supply chain, they win the confidence of their customers. Resultantly, they are encouraged to move up the technology ladder.

The Challenges

Defence sector is dominated by multinational giants that straddle across the complete spectrum of defence equipment, thereby creating unequal playing ground. SMEs are small players with limited resources and cannot compete on their own. They need governmental support to thrive and deliver. Some of the major challenges faced by them are as follows:-

a) Awareness Deficit

i. Being unaware of future capability requirements and perspective plans, SMEs are unable to do advance planning for impending business opportunities.

ii. They are unable to obtain information about all procurement proposals for timely enrolment as vendors. Many opportunities are lost by default as no vendor can be added to the list after the issuance of tender documents.

iii. They lack accessible information on clustering/partnering opportunities and foreign partnerships.

iv. They lack knowledge about foreign markets for necessary economies of scale.

b) Financial Constraints

i. Defence business is characterised by long and complex procurement procedures. Companies need protracted staying power and adequate financial endurance for long term sustainment. They may still not get the contract. For SMEs, such investment risks can prove dissuasive.

ii. In case of developmental contracts, time lag between R&D and returns can be excessively long, resulting in cash flow problems.

iii. Due to the uncertainties of defence business, no venture capital is available to SMEs in India. Banks are equally reluctant to lend.

iv. Lack of sufficient capital inhibits their foray into export markets

c) Entry Pangs

i. A new entrant finds it hard to break into existing supply chains. Well established equations between prime contractors and current suppliers, built over a long period of partnership, inhibits entry of newcomers.

ii. It is hard for SMEs to get timely information about existence/emergence of gaps in a supply chain to be able to attempt entry.

d) Marketing Challenges

i. As MoD is the main and even sole customer of their products, subsequent variation in budgetary allocations or change of priorities of procurement proposals can adversely affect flow of orders after the creation of necessary facilities.

ii. Economies-of-scale is a constant concern as access to export markets is limited, especially for sub-assemblies independent of the complete systems.

iii. Creation of necessary visibility to make government and primary defence companies aware of their products and services is a major challenge.

iv. Fear of fresh competition can be quite unnerving for established SMEs since new entrants always cut prices to gain entry.

e) Dissuasive System

i. There are over 150 major defence procurement agencies in India. As there is no centralised procurement bulletin, SMEs have to incur considerable administrative expenses to maintain liaison with all of them

ii. Bureaucratic functioning and red tape can test perseverance of even a die-hard optimist and dampen his enthusiasm for working with defence.

iii. DPP and the Defence Production Policy provide little incentive/support to SMEs, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation by big players.

iv. Costs associated with IPR protection and user rights generate financial convolutions.

Opportunities

It is a common saying that business opportunities exist all the time but only the vigilant entrepreneurs can spot them. However, one does not have to be a visionary to recognise the existence of unprecedented opportunities that are presently available in the Indian defence sector. With India’s shopping list exceeding USD 100 billion in the next few years and corresponding inflow of offset business of up to USD 40 billion, business prospects are enormous. A fair share will certainly flow to SMEs.

Some of the areas in which SMEs can thrive are given below:-

a) For major acquisitions, SMEs can become sub-vendors to prime contractors for the supply of sub-assemblies and components. They can supply items which are developed in-house by them. Or else, items can be manufactured as per the specifications and designs supplied by the buying contractor. However, SMEs must move up the value chain as they gain experience.

b) Vast opportunities for the development and manufacture of niche items to fight asymmetrical wars, terrorism and insurgency have emerged. Demand for explosive detectors, scanners, IED suppressers, bomb disposal equipment, bullet proof jackets and such items has increased multifold. Such items can be best produced by SMEs.

c)India is undertaking many large-scale and multi-dimensional projects like F-INSAS (Future Infantry Soldier as a System), Network Centric Warfare and Tactical Communication System. SMEs can gainfully join hands with other companies to excel in the areas of their expertise.

Bulk of major weapon systems held by the Indian armed forces are closer to becoming obsolescent and need upgradation to extend their useful life. Some of the major upgradation programmes involve T-72 MBT, 133 mm M-46 Medium Gun, L-70 AD Gun, Schilka (SP) AD Gun, BMP-2 ICV, Alouette-II/III Helicopters, Sea Harrier, IL-38 MRA, Sea King and Kamov Anti-Submarine Helicopters and Fire Control Radars. Enormous business opportunities exist for SMEs in such programmes as they entail multiple technologies.

e) As the world trade is heading towards the ‘Global Village’ concept, highly competitive SMEs can secure an international position by exploiting their specialised knowledge and skills. It will help them achieve economies of scale. They can collaborate with SMEs from other countries as well.

f) Maintenance of imported equipment also throws up huge opportunities for SMEs as foreign suppliers find it more beneficial to have competent Indian partners to provide maintenance support.

g) In order to fulfill offset obligations worth billions of dollars, foreign suppliers will need to partner not only the large Indian companies but also efficient SMEs. It is for the enterprising SMEs to position themselves accordingly.

h) Policy for joint R&D under the ‘Make’ procedure for ‘High Technology Complex Systems’ and ‘Low Technology Mature Systems’ has been liberalised. SMEs are encouraged to establish joint R&D ventures with Indian public and private sector. Even DRDO is seeking joint co-development of sensitive systems.

The Way Forward

SMEs possess huge potential. However, they need support and facilitative environment for sustenance and delivery. It is time detailed studies are carried out to understand the complexities of their dynamics. It is only then that the required steps can be taken.

The following measures will go a long way in promoting SMEs and tapping their full potential:-

a) By the Government

i. A national policy to nurture and protect SMEs in the defence sector should be evolved. It should not be merely a statement of intent but contain specific time-bound action plan.

ii. The long promised special fund should be set up to provide financial support to deserving SMEs. In times of financial crisis, they should be helped through painless financing instruments. More importantly, timely payments against supplies should be ensured.

iii. Information regarding future capability requirements and impending tenders should be disseminated through fortnightly electronic bulletins, as is done in many countries.

iv. Involvement of SMEs should be strengthened in R&D projects through special financing. However, it should be ensured that all indigenous competencies are factored in and no wasteful duplication of effort takes place.

v. Regular interaction between the Government, trade/industrial associations and SMEs should take place for active engagement.

vi. A data base should be prepared of all SMEs in the defence sector with their capabilities duly highlighted.

vii. As SMEs do not get to know of all impending tenders in advance, an exception should be made in their respect as regards addition of new vendors after the issuance of tender documents.

viii. Defence Offset and Facilitation Agency should have a section exclusively to help SMEs with offset opportunities. Exports should be facilitated.

b) By Trade/Industrial Associations

i. SMEs often complain that their interests are being neglected by their trade/industrial associations as these have been hijacked to serve the interests of a few aggressive big players. Such a trend must be reversed. Big players can thrive on their own whereas SMEs need hand-holding.

ii. Regular interactions should be facilitated between prime contractors and SMEs to help them develop partnerships.

iii. Support and advice on procurement processes, administrative and legal issues should be provided through training capsules.

iv. Periodic surveys should be carried out of the functioning of SMEs and issues of concern should be projected to the Government.

v. Information dissemination should be improved regarding public procurement opportunities for SMEs.

c) By SMEs

i. They should pool their efforts, increase R&D spending and strive to move up the technology ladder.

ii. They must improve their visibility and be known to the procurement agencies and other customers.

iii. Clustering/partnering with other companies can prove mutually beneficial and cut overheads.

iv. They must develop cross-sectoral skills and acquire full knowledge about procedures and contractual obligations.

Finally

It must be remembered that there is no place for laggards in the defence business. Competition is tough and defence technology becomes obsolescent rapidly. No external support can sustain SMEs that fail to innovate continuously to improve their niche expertise.

Most importantly, SMEs must establish their credibility for performance, quality assurance and timely supplies. It is only then that they can secure a place for themselves in the supply chain and aspire to flourish in business. The Government can act as a facilitator only. It is for aspiring SMEs to make use of the enormous opportunities that the defence sector has thrown up by understanding nuances of defence business and demonstrating a strong commitment to succeed. To succeed, every SME has to be capability driven, competent and competitive – and, that is the ruling mantra.