Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM, PhD
Recent media reports of the army seeking deviations to the Services Qualitative Requirements (SQR) in respect of BAE M777 155mm Light-Weight Towed Howitzers have raised many questions as regards the advisability of the proposal. Indian army has been enduring critical deficiencies in its field artillery inventory. Since the procurement of 410 Bofors Howitzers in 1986-87, no new asset has been inducted. As per reports appearing in the press, India possesses barely 200 pieces of 25-year old Bofors in serviceable condition at present. This shortage has been a matter of serious concern
A number of attempts have been made to procure artillery guns in an open multi-vendor competition over the last one decade. Unfortunately, due to the inability of the defence procurement regime to deliver, all efforts have proved futile. In the meanwhile, the current holding of serviceable medium guns has slipped to an alarmingly low level. As an interim measure, India has decided to procure 145 M777 howitzers from the US to meet its emergent requirements for mountainous terrain. The package, costing close to 647 million dollars, includes Laser Inertial Artillery Pointing Systems, associated parts/equipment, training and logistical support.
It is certainly a desperate move as the howitzer had failed to comply with SQR during the field trials. Procurement is being carried out on single-vendor non-competitive basis from the US under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. The move militates against the underlying spirit of the much touted Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) which mandates that all defence purchases be made through competitive bidding on the basis of diligently-evolved SQR.
The Mismatch
Indian armed forces seek equipment for the performance of precise and well-identified operational functions. SQR specify minimum essential military requirements, corresponding to the task or tasks to be performed by the system. Therefore, SQR form the basis of all military procurements and are required to lay down user’s requirements in a comprehensive, structured and concrete manner. In addition, SQR must express the said requirement in terms of capability desired with minimum required verifiable functional characteristics. In other words, parameters mentioned in SQR are considered inescapable for the equipment to perform its envisaged operational role. By implication it means that any dilution of SQR would amount to compromising operational exploitation of equipment and adversely affect its potential to provide required service fully. Therefore, DPP lays considerable stress on the sanctity of SQR and categorically rules out grant of any waivers after the issuance of Request for Proposals.
On the other hand, FMS contracts are government-to-government deals under which the US government offers for sale those items which have already been inducted into its own armed forces. Defence Security Cooperation Agency of the Pentagon either procures them afresh from the manufacturers or supplies them from its existing reserve stocks. The process starts with a Letter of Request from the aspiring buyer to the US government. In case the US government is amenable to the sale, it sends a Letter of Offer, containing detailed terms and conditions. The buying government has to indicate its unconditional and total acceptance of all conditions of sale through a Letter of Acceptance (LAC) along with initial advance. It needs to be reiterated here that the US government accepts no change in the draft contract and it is a ‘take it or leave it’ option for the buyer nation.
Needless to say, equipment inducted in the US forces would have been developed as per the parameters laid down by them to meet performance requirements stipulated by them. Formulation of operational parameters is always country-specific and is a function of the following factors:-
· Own design of battle and operational doctrine.
· Capabilities and tactics of likely adversaries in short, medium and long terms.
· Terrain and climate.
· Compatibility with existing defence equipment and systems.
· Technological advancements.
· Cost-affordability analysis.
Being the sole super power, the US forces require military systems that are considerably different than those required by the Indian armed forces. Further, there is a huge technology gap. Whereas the US is a technology powerhouse, Indian forces are still struggling to graduate from second to third generation technology. Thus there is a significant mismatch.
Failure to Comply with Key Parameters
As seen above, SQR contains a set of essential parameters. Although no inter-se priority is accorded to them, some parameters are always of key importance. As per press reports, during the field trials held in actual terrain conditions to validate performance claims, M777 howitzer failed to meet Indian SQR with respect to the following aspects:-
· Direct firing trials both during day and night.
· Compatibility with the firing tables drawn by the Indian army.
· Air transportation, para-dropping and helicopter underslung mode.
· Night vision sighting system.
· Inbuilt communication system.
· Barrel life, minimum range and anti-skid mechanism.
It must be stated at the outset that M777 is a proven field artillery system and its failure to meet Indian SQR is in no way a reflection of its worth and utility. It is just that it has been developed on the basis of a different set of SQR. Under FMS route, India has to accept the equipment as it exists and its own parameters become inconsequential. Hence, before initiating requests under this route, India must be fully convinced of the usefulness of the equipment being sought.
M777 howitzers are made of titanium and are ultra light in weight and cost considerably more. Non-compliance with key Indian SQR raises serious doubts about its utility in Indian environment. As India is procuring the howitzers for employment in mountainous terrain, air transportability (for speedy deployment and switching of locations) and direct firing capability become obligatory criteria. The Kargil War has proved that field artillery can become a battle winning factor in direct firing role in mountainous terrain. Unfortunately, M777 has failed to satisfy Indian standards in both the capabilities. Indian decision makers have to consider this critical shortcoming before finalising the deal. Can M777 perform the desired operational tasks? If the answer is in the negative, should India make a compromise and accept equipment that delivers sub-optimal performance?
Flouting DPP Provisions
It is being claimed that Section 71 of DPP allows procurements from friendly foreign countries, based on mutually agreed provisions between the governments of both the countries. Government-to-government deals are certainly permitted but with the rider that such deals should be ‘necessitated due to geo-strategic advantages that are likely to accrue to our country’. It is agreed that FMS procedure does fall under ‘mutually agreed government-to-government’ category but no geo-strategic advantages can be cited to be accruing from the deal. Failure to procure equipment in an open competitive multi-vendor environment cannot be enough justification for invoking provisions of Section 71.
Press reports also indicate that the sanction of the Defence Minister is being sought under Section 75 to deviate from the prescribed procedure. Section 75 is an overarching provision that should be used in the rarest of the rare cases as it implies failure of DPP. Strangely, India is reported to be resorting to post validation of operational requirements. It is an ill-advised move. Many non-US arms manufacturers are already alleging that most US contractors are hard selling their equipment through FMS route, thereby eliminating all competition and piggyback riding on the US government facilitation.
According to reports emanating from the US, no offsets are being sought in the deal. India has apparently decided to forego offset benefits worth 200 million dollars (30 percent of 647 million dollars package). This may be due to the fact that the requirement is emergent and India does not want slippages on account of offsets.
Conclusion
Undoubtedly, FMS route offers unique benefits. In addition to fixed prices and sovereign guarantees, the buyer nation is saved considerable effort as the procurement is carried out by the US government. Further, the US Government shares its experience with respect to logistics, training and exploitation. As regards India, the greatest plus point is that there can be no middlemen in FMS deals. On the minus side, buyer has to accept the equipment as it comes and as per the US draft contract. FMS route is also more expensive as US Government charges the purchaser for sales negotiations, case implementation, contract negotiation, contract management, financial management and allied expenses.
Dilution of SQR is a major compromise and should be made only as a last resort and that too, after considering effects of equipment’s inability to perform key operational functions. In the case of M777 howitzers, India must weigh all factors thoroughly before arriving at a decision. In case procurement through FMS is considered inescapable, it would be better to reformulate SQR accordingly and then proceed ahead. Post validation of SQR will set a wrong precedent and is fraught with dangers of getting the whole process mired in unsavory controversy.
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