Three Myths of Modern Indian History

Three Myths of Modern Indian History

Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM, PhD

Definition of history continues to defy universal acceptance. Whereas some consider history to be an ‘unproved or false collective belief’, Elbert Hubbard calls it ‘gossip well told’. Voltaire refers to historians as ‘gossips who tease the dead’. “Most history is guessing, and the rest is prejudice,” aver Will and Ariel Durant. Mark Twain goes to the extent of declaring, “The very ink with which all history is written is merely fluid prejudice”.

When gossip, guessing and prejudice combine together in historical setting and backdrop, myths are born. Though bereft of any truth, these myths are intentionally perpetuated as facts by distorting true history to justify certain events and actions. When repeated continually, myths get accepted as historical realities. Four common myths of modern Indian history are discussed below to correct common misconceptions.

Myth 1: Grant of Special Status and Offer of Plebiscite to Kashmir were Historical Compulsions

Despite having signed the Standstill Agreement, Pakistan invaded the state of Jammu and Kashmir on 22 October 1947, catching both the vacillating Maharaja and the Government of India off guard. The attackers made rapid progress and were soon on the outskirts of Srinagar. The state witnessed destruction of life and property of unprecedented proportions. In Sheikh Abdullah’s words – “The invaders who came in the name of Pakistan to make us believe that they were true servants of Islam, scorched our land, ruined our homes, despoiled the honours of our women and devastated hundreds of our villages. These lovers of Pakistan dishonoured our mosques which they turned into brothels to satisfy their animal lust with abducted women".

Unable to stop the ruthless marauders, the Maharaja beseeched Indian help by highlighting his own inability to defend his state and said, “It has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and looting. The number of women who have been kidnapped and raped makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my Government, as a first step to over running the whole State.” He offered to sign an Instrument of Accession to India vide his letter dated 26 October 1947 and sought its military assistance. Sensing gravity of the situation, Government of India accepted the Instrument of Accession on the very next day (27 October 2010) and commenced military assistance soon thereafter.

The Instrument of Accession as offered by the Maharaja was a standard document with inbuilt option to reject the Indian constitution. Clause 7 read – “Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit me in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into agreements with the Government of India under any such future constitution.” Once the situation stabilized, the J&K Constituent Assembly changed its stand. Quoting the above clause, Kashmir refused to accept draft Indian constitution circulated in November 1949. It demanded and got special status through Article 370.

It is incomprehensible as to why India let the Maharaja impose such conditions in his letter of offer for accession. He was on his knees. The population and public sentiment were totally anti-Pakistan. All the major political parties of Kashmir were also in favour of joining the Indian Dominion. It was a golden opportunity for India to demand an unconditional accession/merger. Indian leadership erred terribly by not taking advantage of the opportunity presented to it on a platter by Pakistan’s recklessness in seeking a military solution.

Worse, while accepting the Instrument of Accession, Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor General of Independent India, in an accompanying letter to the Maharaja of the same date (27 October 2010) stated, “It is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.” It was a totally unconstitutional and unwarranted offer. There are very few similar examples in the history of shooting in one’s own foot of equal enormity. Plebiscite has become a millstone around India’s neck.

Today, Article 370 is seen as the root cause of the separatist psyche. It keeps reminding Kashmiri men and women that they are a special lot and different than other Indians. Even after a gap of over sixty years, Omar Abdullah had the audacity to declare on the floor of the state assembly that Kashmir had not ‘merged’ with India in 1947 but ‘acceded’ to it and that Kashmir is an issue between two neighbours.

As seen above, it is a myth that India was forced to grant special status to Kashmir or offer plebiscite due to the force of circumstances. It was an act of gross omission by shortsighted Indian leadership.

Myth 2: Recognition of Chinese Sovereignty over Tibet was Inevitable

Although China claims that Tibet had been under its rule since the period of Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368), the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) contests such claims. ICJ is of the view that during the period 1913-1950, Tibet conducted its own domestic and foreign affairs free from any outside authority, thereby demonstrating the conditions of statehood as generally accepted under international law. Moreover, in pursuance of its policy of treating Tibet to be an independent country, albeit under token Chinese suzerainty, Britain signed the Simla Convention with Tibet in 1914.

After emerging victorious in the civil war, the People's Liberation Army's entered Tibet in 1950 and by early 1951 it had established its control over the entire country. Subsequently on 23 May 1951, the local Tibetan Government was coerced to sign the Seventeen-Point Agreement and ‘peaceful liberation of Tibet’ was declared to be complete. As the rebellion of Eastern Kham and Amdo engulfed the whole country, Chinese authorities crushed it ruthlessly in 1959, forcing the Dalai Lama to flee to India.

In 1950, sensing threat from expansionist China, Tibet sought recognition of its independent status from the world community. Unfortunately, the Indian leadership failed to appreciate the strategic need to have an independent Tibet as a buffer between India and China. It toed the Chinese line and told the Tibetans that it was not enough to speak about Tibet’s independence without first proving it according to the law. It went to the extent of downplaying the importance of the Simla Convention – “China never accepted it and the Chinese believe that Tibet is a part of China…At that time Tibet did not make any clear decision. That was a mistake.” Further, India advised the Tibetan delegation in April 1951 to admit that Tibet was a part of China. India thus became instrumental in letting China fortify its claim over hapless Tibet in the comity of nations.

Understandably, India was in no position to ensure Tibet’s independence – but it did not have to support the Chinese claims unequivocally. A policy of deliberate and calculated ambiguity and vacillation would have served the Indian interests best. India should have used the question of Tibet’s status to extract reciprocal concessions in boundary and Kashmir issues on quid pro quo basis from China. Despite the fact that the United Nations General Assembly has passed a number of resolutions upholding the rights of Tibetans of self-determination, India continues to reiterate its absolute support of the Chinese claims.

By linking Chinese acceptance of Sikkim as a part of India with Chinese control over Tibet in 2003, the Indian leadership showed an utter lack of understanding of Chinese intentions. As a result thereof, we are now witness to the latest Chinese mischief of claiming Arunachal Pradesh to be a part of Tibet. India should have followed a policy of continual ambivalence forcing China to remain sensitive to Indian concerns as well. Whereas we have frittered away the Tibet card, China continues to question Indian stand on Kashmir.

Myth 3: Liberation of Bangla Desh was a Strategic Masterstroke

It is often claimed that liberation of Bangla Desh in 1971 was a strategic and diplomatic masterstroke of unprecedented proportions. It was certainly an exceptional military victory but India failed to make it a strategic achievement.

Erstwhile East Pakistan was an albatross around the neck of the ‘moth-eaten Pakistan’. Rulers in Islamabad could neither accept it as an equal partner nor ignore it due to its enormous vote-power. No political party could hope to come to power by disregarding political equations of East Pakistan. Being more populous with a smaller area to sustain it, most West Pakistanis considered East Pakistan to be a liability. Further, with the vast Indian sub-continent separating the two parts, defence of the country became a huge challenge. A Pakistani General publically called East Pakistan ‘a cancerous growth in Pakistan’s body politic’.

Due to language differences, linkages through religion proved highly tenuous. Internal dissentions and strife became so strong that millions of East Pakistanis sought refuge in India to escape persecution at the hands of West Pakistani military and their henchmen. Indian political leadership considered it to be a golden opportunity to cut Pakistan to size by helping creation of an independent Bangla Desh. It was based on two assumptions – one, a grateful Bangla Desh would always be a friendly nation, and two, a shrunk Pakistan would cease to be a bothersome adversary.

India was soon to realise its folly and naivety in expecting gratitude from Bangla Desh. Within a few years, Bangla Deshis forgot all Indian help and sacrifices. They also forgot the loot, plunder, rapes and atrocities committed on them by West Pakistani forces. Religion, which could not keep the two wings together earlier, became a strong bond for Bangla Desh to warm up to Pakistan. “Imagine the degree of ingratitude – some politicians in Bangla Desh are colluding with Pakistan to provide sanctuaries to ultras fighting India, the country to whom it owes its existence,” remarked a veteran soldier. Such views convey the degree of disillusionment and disgust amongst Indian soldiers who shed their blood in the 1971-war.

As regards Pakistan, once the memories of ignominies of defeat slid into the background, many Pakistani writers appeared relieved at the ridding of the bondage of East Pakistan. Inadvertently, India had done a huge favour to them. Many experts are of the view that India should have let Pakistan suffer and bleed as reconciliation between the two wings of Pakistan could never have been possible. Today, Pakistan is a more compact and defendable country.

On the other hand, with a friendly Government in power in newly independent Bangla Desh, India failed to utilise the opportunity to settle all irksome border issues and reduce the vulnerability of the sensitive Siliguri corridor. Thus, despite an unprecedented military victory, India made no concrete strategic gains.