Monday, October 29, 2018

Pokhran II: the challenge of sinking shafts


Pokhran II: the challenge of sinking shafts

Major General Mrinal Suman

A first-hand account of 113 Engineer Regiment’s indomitable spirit, determination and ingenuity in digging two 600 feet deep shafts in 1981-82 which made Pokhran II possible in 1998



Hoisting Bucket with Winder Assembly in the Background
(Photo courtesy Nikita Dhingra)

Pokhran II took place in May 1998 under Operation Shakti. A total of five tests with weapon grade plutonium were conducted – three on 11 May and two on 13 May. The tests included a 45 kt fusion bomb (also called hydrogen or thermonuclear bomb), a 15 kt fission bomb (atomic bomb) and three experimental sub-atomic devices of 0.5, 0.3 and 0.2 kt respectively. 
  
Dr K Santhanam of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was the director for the test site preparations. In an interview to Times Now TV channel in April 2008, he revealed that India had dug two deep shafts at Pokhran in 1981-82. The fission and fusion bombs were placed in these shafts. For sub-atomic tests, use was made of three abandoned dry wells in the near vicinity. These wells had earlier been dug by the villagers and deserted as no water had been struck.
  
The Indira Gandhi government had decided to carry out tests in 1982-83 and the army was asked to sink the shafts. 113 Engineer Regiment completed the task ahead of schedule but the tests were shelved due to external pressures. More than a decade later, Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao asked the scientists to go ahead with the tests in 1994-95. Unfortunately, the US satellites detected the preparations. Once again, India was forced to abort the tests.
A word about shaft sinking will be in order here. To approach underground mineral seams, a vertical opening (shaft) is provided from the surface to the mining zone. These shafts are used to carry men, material and equipment to the mining zone; as also, to haul the extracted ore to the surface. Being the lifelines of all underground mines, shafts are sunk with exacting technical specifications.

Essentially, a shaft contains a head-frame (tower)  to house the hoist; a shaft collar of  reinforced concrete to provide foundation support to the head frame and to accommodate mechanism for men, materials and services to enter and exit the shaft; and shaft barrel that continues from the collar to the planned depth. The shaft also carries ducts for the pumping of fresh air, dewatering pipes and electrical fittings. All mining manuals term shaft sinking to be the most dangerous and hazardous task of all mining operations. It requires domain expertise and specialised equipment. There are a handful of shaft sinking companies in the world, normally called ‘sinkers’. All mining companies outsource shaft sinking operations to them.

113 Engineer Regiment, located at Jodhpur, was asked to undertake the task. The regiment was under the command of the late Lt Col KC Dhingra (later rose to the rank of Major General). Col Dhingra was an extremely intelligent officer with phenomenal memory and exceptional capacity for sustained hard work. The regiment was acutely aware of the criticality of the task and the trust that had been reposed in its capability to deliver. It was determined not to let the nation down. I was a Major in the regiment and had the privilege of being involved from the beginning to the culmination of the task.






Head Frame Tower under Camouflage Nets
(Photo courtesy Dhingra)

It was an unprecedented assignment. To sink a shaft hundreds of feet deep with no experience and no equipment was a huge challenge – more so as none of the officers had ever visited a mine or seen a shaft; nor had anyone studied mining engineering which is a specialised course. Although site preparations for Pokhran-I were also carried out by the army engineers, the task was of entirely different genre and did not entail sinking of subterranean shafts ab initio. Pokhran-I was conducted at a much shallower depth, using an abandoned dry well. 

Site Selection

It was the month of January 1981. After an exercise in the desert, Col Dhingra asked me to accompany him for an operational reconnaissance. While driving to the Pokhran ranges he told me that the regiment had been tasked to sink a deep shaft of more than 500 feet. Repeatedly stressing the need for secrecy of the mission, he gave out other broad parameters. With maps in our hands, we traversed the ranges a number of times over the next two days to get a feel of its extent and zeroed on to a nine square km area that satisfied our security and secrecy concerns. It was well away from the highways and the villages. The aim was to identify a location where the water would pose minimal impediment to the shaft sinking operations. Hence, site selection was a highly critical step. But, how to go about it? We had no knowledge.

Within a week, I was back in the Pokhran area with a team of officers and men for detailed ground reconnaissance. After much  scouting and ground survey, we selected four tentative sites that lay in the inter-dunal low-lying areas with least sand overburden. We also approached the nearby villagers to draw benefit from their local knowledge. We told them that the army wanted to establish a permanent camp and was looking for reliable water sources. We showed them the four sites and asked them to advice as to where the water could be found. We, of course, intended to eliminate those sites.

One evening, without informing us, the local headman brought a water diviner from Pokhran town  and started appraising the sites. It was a full moon night. Water divining is an esoteric ancient method in which the locals have immense faith. It is believed that the flow of underground water induces some vital currents above the surface and a person with induction attributes can sense them through the movement of a freshly plucked twig. We watched in disbelief while the water diviner announced that none of the sites held abundant water. For us, it was just a gratuitous input of little consequence as the technique lacked scientific authentication. 

We approached Central Arid Zone Research Institute (CAZRI) at Jodhpur for help in identifying water sources. They explained to us that the availability of perched aquifers (an underground layer of water-bearing permeable rock, rock fractures or unconsolidated materials) and underground streams depended on the geology and geomorphology of the area. CAZRI readily gave us geologic and topographic maps of the area. We studied them in detail, trying to relate them to the four sites selected by us. However, we were still not confident and sought application of a more exact and scientific method.

After much persuasion, Col Dhingra agreed to seek help of a local hydrogeology agency that specialised in water prospecting for wells. The agency was told the same story i.e.  the army was looking for a camp site with a water source. The agency could carry out core drilling for geologic sampling up to 150 feet only. Once again, the core logging declared all the sites ‘unfit for sinking well’, meaning thereby that water was not available in exploitable quantity. Even the seismic survey gave the same report. Though encouraging, the reports were not a clincher as we had to go down to more than 500 feet.

After studying all the inputs (whatever be their worth), we selected two sites. In consultation with the higher authorities, it was decided to attempt digging at more than one site to cater for unforeseen hold-ups. However, as the work progressed, the authorities decided to go ahead with both the shafts.

Sinking of the Shafts

Two task forces were constituted and the work started at both the sites in Feb 1981 end without much fanfare. A small ceremony was held to invoke blessings of Ramdevra, the ruling deity of the desert whom the locals consider to be an incarnation of Lord Krishna. Thereafter, diameter of the shaft was marked on the ground with pegs and the digging commenced with picks and shovels. For a few days, hauling of the dug earth was done manually with mortar pans. Thereafter, the unit crane was deployed with a modified coal-tar drum. Soon the crane rope reached its limit. To prevent caving in, revetment of the walls was done with flattened CGI sheets and iron pickets.







As learnt in field engineering, tripod gantry with blocks and tackles to hoist a pulley system was erected. Reeving was done by threading the winch drum cable of a dozer. A larger semi-elliptical bucket was fabricated for removing earth. Such expedients can at best be of interim help. The dozer cable had limited length and worse, the wire-rope started fraying with strands coming apart. In fact, it was ill-suited for the task as the bucket used to swing wildly due to the wire-rope lacking non-twist construction. Soon the digging came to a standstill.

Anticipating the requirement for a proper hoisting arrangement, a team had already been sent to Calcutta to identify and procure a suitable haulage system. After considerable effort, a winder assembly manufactured by a local industrialist was identified. Orders were placed for immediate delivery and operators sent for training. With the imminent arrival of the ground-mounted winder assembly, the head-frames (also called winding tower, poppet head or pit head) were quickly constructed with bailey bridge equipment to house the sheave wheel. 

While awaiting arrival of the winders, the time was duly utilised to cast shaft collars (also called the ‘bank’ or ‘deck’) with heavy reinforced concrete in three tiers/levels for required stability. In addition, troops familiarised themselves with the ‘drill and blast method’. A bevy of generators and air-compressors were requisitioned. Captain SB Pendse ingeniously established reliable grids to ensure uninterrupted supply of electricity and compressed air.  
    
As regards the geology and the rock formation of the sites. After having cleared the sand over-burden, we encountered conglomerate consisting of gravel, sand stone and silt stone. Digging was tough as the drill used to get stalled in the bores. We also encountered shale, a fine-grained clastic sedimentary rock. It is a mudstone that is  fissile and laminated. Instability of the shaft walls became a matter of concern. Loose or unstable portions often fell down due to the vibrations caused by the drill.

During Pokhran-I, within one month of commencing digging, loose shale strata had fallen on the digging party, killing one and injuring four persons. Criticality of shaft stability was well understood by us. At deeper depths, a cave-in could bury the working party alive. Initially, we tried to anchor wire mesh with rock-bolts on the walls to trap falling stones. It proved to be of little use. Blasts used to loosen rocks along the natural cracks on the walls, uprooting the mesh.

Choice of shaft lining depends on the nature of rock strata. In some shafts, lining is done with precast concrete segments and shotcrete. Concrete is highly reliable but is normally used for shafts that are permanent or long-lasting. It is an expensive and time consuming option. In our case, the shafts were required urgently and for one-off use only. We were at our wit’s end. After much deliberations, we hit upon a unique system of having prefabricated steel jackets in the form of segments of a circle. These could be  easily lowered into the shafts and bolted together to form a circular steel liner. Provision had been made to drive rock bolts through them for proper anchoring. Jackets also lent themselves to grouting to block water ingress.  

Time for each ‘drill and blast’ cycle varied with the rock formation encountered for drilling and the depth of the shaft. As we went deeper the turnaround time of the haulage bucket increased significantly and removal of rubble took much longer. A standard cycle consisted of the following steps:-
·         Clearing of the floor of the shaft and construction of a sump in a corner to collect and pump out water.
·         Drilling of multiple slanting holes of varying depth to create free face with delayed detonators for optimum blast effect.
·         Filling of the holes with explosive and connecting all detonators through a ring main circuit for firing.
·         Removal of drills, pumps and other construction equipment out of the shaft.
·         Firing of the charges.
·         Removal of the blasted rock (rubble) to obtain the floor face for the next cycle of drilling.


Misfire used to be the most dreaded nightmare. A single defective detonator could fail the entire circuit and the charges would remain unfired. In that case, one had to wait for two hours before entering the shaft, lest a stray spark set the explosive off. Thereafter, the senior-most officer at the site had to go down to the base of the shaft to remove all the charges. By then the shaft used to be flooded with water.  It was a highly risky task. The water used to be murky and the officer had to go underwater to locate all the charges by touch. The whole ring main circuit had to be dismantled and all detonators brought over-ground for replacement. Every such misfire invariably put our progress back by a day.

At each shaft, the work was carried out round the clock in shifts. Daily progress report was being submitted to the authorities. After every 10 feet of depth, we had to pause to stabilise the shaft walls with steel jackets and rock-bolts. 

We encountered water seepage at 60 feet depth. Although the quantity of inflow was limited, it still posed problems in digging. It had to be collected in a sump and pumped out at intervals. Only electricity driven  submersible pumps possess high pump-head. However, they cannot be used in the shafts due to the risk of electrocution of the working party. During Pokhran-I (January 1974), ingress of water had stalled the progress on the shaft within three months of commencing digging. The problem could not be solved even by the scientists. In the end, the incomplete shaft had to be abandoned. As there was no time for attempting a  fresh shaft, a dry abandoned well was prepared for the test in May 1974.

We were totally at a loss. To learn about the methodology to pump out water, Col Dhingra and the two shaft commanders (Major S Jagannathan and I) made a quick visit to Khetri copper mines and Zawar zinc mines. There, for the first time, we saw the air operated double diaphragm (AODD) pumps and immediately realised their indispensability. Steps were initiated to procure them. Their receipt helped us go full steam ahead. There was no stopping us thereafter. With the maximum head of AODD pumps being limited, we evolved a system of pumping out water by stages. As we went down, additional stages were erected.





Commanding Officer Lt Col KC Dhingra, Task Force Commanders Maj Mrinal Suman and Maj S Jagannathan

The scientists in army uniforms used to visit us periodically to study the progress and specify additional facilities for tests. They expressed the requirement of niches/alcoves at various depths of the shafts for placing monitoring instruments. Cabling network was also indicated. A tall observation tower was constructed at a distance with crib-piers.

On reaching the stipulated depth, we were asked to make a side chamber of a large bed room size. As a powerful nuclear device is always placed under natural rock strata to contain blast effect, thermal radiation and radio-active fallout, such a requirement was already anticipated by us. We knew that our shafts would finally be L-shaped. The side chambers was duly completed without much difficulty and completion report submitted.

Soon, we received mock-ups of the nuclear devices. They were lowered and placed in the side chambers to ascertain suitability of the hoisting mechanism. The scientists had demanded that the chambers should be ‘without a drop of water’. We had to harness considerable ingenuity to achieve that. To demonstrate the dryness of the chamber, we laid a carpet on the chamber’s floor and gave tea to the scientists from a thermos flask. The scientists were keyed up and ecstatic. One of them poignantly commented, “Oh my God. This is the most memorable cup of tea – over 600 feet underground”.

The Disappointment: the tests that were not to be

General KV Krishna Rao, Chief of the Army Staff, also visited the shafts. He could not believe that the army engineers had completed the task without any external help.  After visiting both the shafts, he told Col Dhingra, “I knew it was a tough assignment but can appreciate its magnitude only after this visit. You have amazed me. You must be a very proud commanding officer. Do you realise that your unit is writing the history of India.” Col Dhingra conveyed the Chief’s words to both the shaft commanders.

Visits by the scientists became more frequent. Things were moving fast. The atmosphere was charged with excitement. Trial with mock-ups was seen by us as a affirmative sign.  We were upbeat and thought that the tests were imminent – it was a question of ‘any day’. However, it was not to be. We waited for days and weeks without the much awaited bang. With great disappointment, we learnt that the government had decided not to go ahead with the tests. It was ruled that the shafts be maintained and dewatered regularly with submersible pumps, awaiting another opportune moment for the tests. 

Our regiment had been in the desert for over three years. We were asked to hand over the maintenance of the completed shafts to another regiment. Various regiments continued with the maintenance till 1998 when they were finally put to nuclear tests. We learnt of the tests with immense pride but somewhere down in our hearts there was a tinge of disappointment. We were not destined to be a part of the historical event. 
  
Sinking the shafts of over 600 feet depth, lining the walls and preparing side chambers in such a compressed time frame had been a monumental achievement. The world over, the average rate of sinking shafts with ‘drill and blast’ method is pegged at 3 feet per week by the professional companies possessing decades of experience, consummate expertise and latest equipment. We, the soldiers of 113 Engineer Regiment, had no experience, no knowledge and no equipment. We did struggle initially but our perseverance helped us overcome all challenges. It was an unparalleled feat by all standards.

According to the information available in public domain, no country in the world has ever asked its army engineers to dig deep shafts for the nuclear tests. As India has declared self-imposed moratorium on nuclear tests, need for deep shafts will never arise again. In other words, the feat of 113 Engineer Regiment will remain unequalled. As General Krishna Rao had stated, 113 Engineer Regiment contributed to the history of India: a unique distinction indeed. The regiment has deservingly earned the appellation Shaft Sinkers to Nuclear India.

Monday, July 30, 2018

Rafale and the Reliance Conundrum


Rafale and the Reliance Conundrum
                                                                      
Major General Mrinal Suman

The debate on the recent no-confidence motion in the Lok Sabha will long be remembered for two notables. One, reprehensible hug-and-wink antics of an immature leader. Two, serious allegations were levelled against the government as regards the probity of the Rafale deal. The first aspect concerns the dignity and decorum of the house; and the posterity will remember it with due repugnance. It is the second aspect that is of much graver concern. For, the Rafale deal, if embroiled in political slugfest, has the potential of harming India’s security and derailing the modernisation programme.

Broadly, the government has been accused of (i) declining to reveal details of the deal under the allegedly sham clause of secrecy; (ii) negotiating a costlier deal; and (iii) ignoring the public sector to favour a private Indian company. All are serious charges and merit scrutiny.

To recall, on the urgent demand of IAF, tenders were issued for 126 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) in August 2007. While 18 aircraft were to be purchased in fully built up condition, the balance quantity was to be manufactured in India by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) under transfer of technology. After extensive trials, two platforms (Dassault’s Rafale and Eurofighter Typhoon)  were found technically acceptable. Finally, Rafale emerged winner due to its lower life-cycle cost. The announcement was made on 31 January 2012 and contract negotiations commenced thereafter.

By 2014, negotiations had reached a total impasse with no signs of possible  breakthrough. In addition to overly escalating cost (from USD 10-12 billion to USD 25-30 billion), two other critical issues proved highly cantankerous. One, Dassault declined  to stand guarantee for the 108 fighters to be built by HAL as it had found HAL to be totally incapable of producing ultra-modern fighters. Two, differences emerged regarding the interpretation of scope and depth of technology transfer. Reportedly, Dassault was ready to part with limited technology for licence manufacture only and not the design technology. With no solution in sight, the then Defence Minister Antony had decided to let the proposal die by default.

Secrecy Clause

It is an accepted fact that major defence deals between the two countries are an instrument of a nation’s foreign policy objectives. They do not take place in isolation and are invariably a part of a larger package agreed to between the two nations. Hence, it is incorrect to view them as standalone commercial contract. Needless to say, many  commitments made as quid pro quo carry serious security implications and are never made public.

India is buying Rafale as a complete fighting system and not just the platform. The real punch lies in the weaponry, avionics, electronics and radars that it carries. Operational capability of a strategic system depends on its configuration and it has to be closely guarded secret. No country reveals such details as the surprise element gets negated and the prospective enemies can initiate counter-measures in advance. It is strange that some knowledgeable experts are wanting the government to release an item-wise comparative cost table. Demand for transparency cannot be carried to such ridiculous limits.

As regards the seller, France has already confirmed that it does not want to reveal the commercial terms of the deal as it has to market the product to other nations as well. Commercial confidentiality is inherent in all government to government deals. There is no MRP for the defence systems.
    
The Negotiated Deal is much Costlier

It is being alleged that the deal negotiated by Modi is at a much higher cost than the one under the UPA regime. It is quite a childish prank. How can one compare a non-deal with a deal. As stated earlier, the earlier negotiations never fructified due to fundamental disagreements. A non-starter aborted arrangement cannot be used as a datum for price comparison?

In addition, the earlier quote was for the platform as such and the negotiations for the add-ons never reached conclusiveness. The current deal includes  large number of India specific capabilities which no other aircraft possesses. To quote an example, the base model of a sedan may cost only 11 lacs while the price of the fully loaded top-end model with all features could well exceed 16 lacs. Can the two costs be compared?

About Favouring the Private Sector Company

The government has been accused of favouring Anil Ambani’s Reliance group by ousting HAL. This is by far the most ridiculous allegation. One does not know whether it is sheer ignorance on the part of the critics or a deliberate plan with malicious motives.

The current Rafale deal does not entail manufacture/assembly of the fighters in India. All 36 aircraft will be manufactured in France and delivered to India fully configured. Hence, the question of having an Indian production partner does not arise. Reliance is not going to manufacture any aircraft. Dassault has selected a number of Indian Offset Partners (IOP) to fulfil its offset obligations and Reliance is one of them, albeit a major one.

Fulfilment of offset obligations entails compensating the buyer country for the outflow of its resources through designated offset programmes. India’s offset policy has been spelt out at Appendix D to Chapter II of the defence procurement procedure. Provisions related to the current discussion are as follows:-
  •  Quantum of Offsets. As per Para 2.2, all ‘Buy Global’ cases of estimated value of more than Rs 2,000 crores have to carry offset obligations equal to 30 percent of the contract value. Interestingly, India has managed to obtain offsets equal to 50 percent of the contract value, despite stiff opposition by the French. It is a huge gain as Dassault has to incur considerable additional expenditure to fulfil extra offset obligations.

·   Selection of IOP.  Para 4.3 unambiguously states that the foreign vendor is free to select IOP and the government has no role to play at all.
·  Responsibility for Fulfilling Offsets. Para 5.1 categorically states that the foreign vendor will be responsible for the fulfilment of offset obligations. Failure invites huge penalty (five percent of the unfulfilled offset obligation with a cap of twenty percent) and even debarment from future contracts. It is a huge punishment by all accounts.
·    Avenues for Discharge of Offset Obligations (Para 3). The policy specifies six avenues for the discharge of offset obligations and the foreign vendor is free to choose any one or a combination of them. The avenues include direct purchase of eligible products and services; FDI in joint ventures; and investment in kind/technology. Eligible products/services  cover the complete range of defence, inland/coastal security and civil aerospace products. It is a vast choice.
The above provisions make eminent sense. If the vendor is responsible for offsets, he must have independence to select IOP in whom he has faith. The government cannot dictate IOP and yet hold the vendor responsible for timely completion. Dassault has chosen Reliance as a major IOP. No one can question it.

It needs to be recalled here that India signed a contract for 22 Apache attack helicopters and 15 Chinook heavy-lift choppers from the US with offset obligations. Boeing chose Tata Advanced Systems, Dynamatic Technologies, Rossel Techsys and many others as IOP. Hence, accusing the government of favouring Reliance in the Rafale deal defies logic.

Finally

In the case of large value deals, government to government route is by far the most cost effective with sovereign guarantees. In addition, the seller government provides logistic, training and exploitation support. Most importantly, there are no middlemen and no slush money. The Rafale deal is no exception. However, every attempt at acquiring game-changing defence capability is deliberately embroiled in controversies by disparate inimical forces.

As has been seen in the past, controversies are deliberately generated by the losing competitors by planting negative stories through paid sources to coerce the decision makers into aborting the deal. In the case of Rafale deal, media reports suggest that the government is considering procurement of additional Rafale fighters, especially the naval version. Apparently, efforts are being made to deter the government from going ahead. The current storm being kicked may well be a manifestation of the same. It is also alleged that some corporate entities are purposely targeted by the politicians to extort election funds.

Every move to induct private sector in defence production is opposed tooth and nail by the public sector. Past performance of HAL has been dismal. With a view to develop alternate facilities for aerospace manufacture in the private sector, the UPA government had initiated a proposal for the manufacture of transport aircraft by a private sector entity in collaboration with a foreign vendor. Tata-Airbus combine was finally selected.

Threatened by the entry of the private sector into its monopolistic domain, HAL cleverly converted the above proposal into a private sector versus public sector war. The proposal has since been lying mired in bureaucratic quandary and no further progress has been made. Every effort to integrate the private sector is thwarted by the patrons of the public sector. In the same vein, in the Rafale case, one has seen some conniving media personnel deceitfully claiming that HAL has been replaced by Reliance.

To criticise and fault the government is fully justified provided the facts support allegations. It is grossly unfair to invent wild allegations, in the hope that some accusations may stick. False accusations to score brownie points vitiate the environment and India’s defence modernisation suffers.  Even the boldest and the most conscientious leaders and officers fear subsequent enquiries. The media must certainly highlight acts of corruption and misdemeanours but it is not necessary to fault every defence deal. Anti-government posturing should not degenerate into anti-national rhetoric.*****   


Tuesday, April 24, 2018

Systematic demolition of the edifice of the Indian Constitution: it is now the turn of the Judiciary


Systematic demolition of the edifice of the Indian Constitution: it is now the turn of the Judiciary

Major General Mrinal Suman

April 20, 2018 will always be remembered as a black day in the history of independent India. Seven opposition parties led by the Congress submitted a proposal to the Vice-President of India, seeking to impeach the current Chief Justice of India (CJI).

Earlier in the second week of January this year, in an unprecedented move, four senior-most judges of the Supreme Court held a press conference. They were scathing in their attack on the functioning of the Supreme Court and stated that ‘the administration of the Supreme Court is not in order and many things which are less than desirable have happened in the last few months’. They, quite unsuccessfully, tried to disguise their public dissention as an extraordinary event ‘to preserve democracy in the country’.

However, the underlying cause of their discontent got revealed when queried about the main issue of concern. The reply was ‘allocation of cases by CJI’. “There have been instances where cases having far reaching consequences for the nation and the institution have been assigned by the chief justices of this court selectively to the benches ‘of their preference’ without any rational basis for such assignment,” they alleged.

When asked if they wanted the CJI to be impeached, Justice Chelameswar’s response was shockingly provocative and instigative. “Let the nation decide,” he said without any hesitation. It was an open suggestion to the dissidents of all hues.

Allocation of cases to different benches is the prerogative of CJI. He carries the authority of being Master of the Roster. The four unhappy judges felt that they were being assigned less important cases. Honestly, one is surprised at their assertion. One thought that every case that comes before the Supreme Court is of utmost importance ‘with far-reaching consequences for the nation’, as every judgment acts as a precedent and guidance for the subordinate judiciary across the country to follow. Where is the question of more or less important cases?

The four judges would have been justified in feeling aggrieved if no cases were being assigned to them, forcing them to sit idle. But that is not the case. They want cases of their interest. It will be interesting to know the number of cases pending before them and the efforts put in by them to dispose them. If they are already well-loaded, they should concentrate on dispensing justice expeditiously rather than go public to demand ‘more important cases’ – finish work in hand and demonstrate your industriousness, before seeking cases of choice.

By going public, the judges trashed the basic norm of organisational conduct – one should never fault or criticise one’s organisation publically while being a part of it. To bring disrepute to one’s organisation by ‘washing dirty linen in public’ is an act of gross disloyalty and unpardonable sacrilege. Issues, if any, must be raised and resolved in-house. If still aggrieved, the right step is to quit the organisation; thereafter one is at liberty to air one’s grievances.

Taking the clue from Justice Chelameswar’s advice, six opposition parties joined the Congress in launching a vicious campaign to impeach CJI. The charges levelled against him are not only frivolous but are laughable. It needs to be recalled here that Article 124(4)  of Constitution of India stipulates that the impeachment of a supreme court judge can only be carried out on the ground of ‘proved misbehaviour or incapacity’. How can the allocation of cases to different benches be termed as misbehaviour warranting impeachment? The Vice-President has rightly rejected the notice, terming it to be lacking in merit.

A look at the chronology of events shows the devious designs of the unscrupulous. Justice BH Loya, who was hearing CBI's case of murder against BJP chief Amit Shah, died of a cardiac arrest in Nagpur in December 2014.

With a view to target Shah, a number of appeals were filed in the Supreme Court seeking independent investigation into Loya’s death. Opposition parties wanted the case to be assigned to a ‘considerate bench’, hoping to get a favourable verdict.

CJI admitted the case. On 12 January, he assigned it to a bench that did not include any of the four dissenting judges. Both the opposition leaders and the dissenting judges were furious. The judges vented their anger at the press conference the same evening. The question arises as to why were the said judges so keen to hear the said case. What special interest did it hold for them?

During the hearing of the case, with a view to put pressure on the bench, the Congress started collecting signatures for the impeachment of CJI. A total of 71 members signed. It was an ominous move of the most vicious kind. It was an open challenge to the top court of the country – rule in our favour or else face impeachment.

Having conveyed the threat, the Congress leaders waited for the verdict in the Loya case. They had expected CJI to get browbeaten and fall in line. Had the verdict been according to the Congress’s demand, impeachment move would have been aborted. But it was not to be.

The court dismissed the petitions on 19 April and an enraged Congress submitted the notice for impeachment the very next day. Incidentally, as the signatures were taken quite some time back, seven signatories had since retired and the list contained only 64 valid signatures.

By acting in an unbecoming manner, the four judges have inflicted immense damage to the esteemed institution. It has left the countrymen stunned. It will take decades for the Supreme Court to regain its lost reputation. Questions have been raised about the impartiality of the four judges. Why were they overly keen to hear Loya case appeals?

As the judges are unhappy with the functioning of the Supreme Court, the most honourable thing for them to do is to resign. In any case, they have lost their credibility as regards fair and objective dispensation of justice. In case they do not take such a step voluntarily, senior members of the bar and the eminent jurists should put pressure on them.

Justice Ranjan Gogoi has ruled himself out for the appointment of CJI. He accepted the fact that the immediate cause of the press conference was the assignment of petition in the Loya case. Why did he feel so aggrieved for not getting the said case? Although he said that they had come before the public ‘to pay a debt to the nation’, many feel that it was in fact ‘to pay a debt to the Congress’. Justice Gogoi has demonstrated his bias and subjectivity openly.

One is not surprised at the conduct of the Congress. It is on a ventilator and wants to retain its relevance at every cost, even if it entails destruction of all the hallowed institutions of the Indian democracy. It wants to subvert the system from within through the planted functionaries. When thwarted in its nefarious designs, it resorts to intimidation tactics through scurrilous innuendoes. All that talk of saving democracy is pure hogwash.

The parliamentary standing committee on law and personnel has recommended that the retirement age of SC judges be raised to 67 years from the present 65 to tide over the existing shortage of judges in the highest court. Modi government should immediately effect the change. Even otherwise, Justice Gogoi’s claim must be disregarded. He is unfit for the top post.  

Interestingly, a number of senior leaders of the Congress have disassociated themselves from the impeachment proposal. Have they rediscovered their spine to disobey the dynasty or is it simply a case of  rats abandoning a sinking ship? It is certainly an ominous sign for the party that ruled this country for more than six decades. However, no tears need to be shed on its suicidal downfall due to its anti-national politics. It is in self-destruct mode.*****