Helicopters for VVIPs: Need to Fix Culpability
Major
General Mrinal Suman
India concluded a contract with
AgustaWestland in February 2010 for the procurement of twelve AW-101
helicopters for the transportation of VVIPs. The Comptroller and
Auditor General of India (CAG) carried out compliance audit of the deal and tabled
its report (No 10 of 2013) in
the Parliament on 13 August 2013. CAG has found the entire process of
acquisition to have deviated from the laid down procedures. It concluded that
the process posed ‘serious questions on accountability and lack of transparency
in the finalization of contract, which need to be addressed’.
Allegations of bribes and payment of commission to win the contract
have been dogging Finmeccanica (AgustaWestland
is a division of Finmeccania) since February 2012. However, arrest of CEO Giuseppe
Orsi in Italy in February 2013 drove India to suspend the contract and hand
over the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation. MoD issued a fact sheet on 14 February 2013. Whereas AgustaWestland has demanded
arbitration proceedings, India Ministry of Defence (MoD) has issued a show-cause
notice to AgustaWestland for the cancellation of the contract.
For all
intents and purposes, the deal is dead. India has already paid about 45 percent of the total cost and received three helicopters. India
is unlikely to accept additional deliveries. A perusal of the CAG Report shows
that the provisions of the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) were breached at
every stage, both in letter and spirit.
Restricted Competition
The objective of issuing
a fresh Request for Proposals (RFP) was to increase competition by reducing the
parameter of flight ceiling from 6,000 to 4,500 meters. However, introduction
of a fresh requirement of minimum cabin height of 1.8 meters on the insistence
of PMO/SPG effectively eliminated all competition. It amounted to tailoring Services
Qualitative Requirements (SQR) to help the chosen vendor.
For the issuance of RFP,
names of vendors are proposed by the concerned Service Headquarters (SHQ). However,
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has the overriding powers to amend the list by
adding or deleting names. Strangely, whereas the earlier RFP had been issued to
eleven vendors, the revised RFP was issued only to six vendors. It needs to be
ascertained as to who ordered elimination of certain vendors and the reasons
thereof. As RFP is issued by MoD, it must explain. It is not clear whether the
new RFP was issued to Eurocopter whose machine EC-225 Super Puma had
emerged fully compliant in the first RFP when flight ceiling was fixed at 6,000
meters.
Field Trials
Field trials are carried out under the aegis of the concerned service
headquarters and are by far the most critical aspect of the entire procedure. Performance
claims of the vendors are validated by putting their equipment through
extensive user trials in all conditions where the
equipment is likely to be deployed. Every RFP mandates that the trials be carried out in India.
Strangely, in gross violation of the policy, the Air
Headquarters (Air HQ) coerced MoD to allow it to conduct trials abroad at the
vendors’ premises. More shockingly, as the helicopter offered by AgustaWestland
was under development, trials were carried out on two representative
helicopters and a mock up of the passenger cabin. In a first of its kind, equipment
was declared fully SQR-compliant when still under development.
It needs to be
ascertained as to what compelling reasons constrained the Air Headquarters to
seek such drastic deviations. Did the Air HQ know that the machine of
AgustaWestland was not ready and could not be sent to India; and hence tried to
bail it out by having a pretense of trials at its premises? Equally worrisomely, contrary to the policy provisions,
different methodologies were employed for the trial evaluation of helicopters
of competing vendors. The Air Headquarters must clarify the issues.
Staff Evaluation Report
The Staff Evaluation Report is prepared by the service
headquarters and contains recommendations regarding acceptability of evaluated
equipment for introduction into service. No equipment that fails to meet all
SQR can ever be considered for acceptance. According to the CAG report,
AgustaWestland was recommended for procurement despite the fact that it did not
satisfy all parameters.
SQR are minimum performance characteristics that are considered
essential to enable the equipment to perform its designated mission. In other
words, non-compliance of any SQR implies a compromise. Why did the Air
Headquarters consider it necessary to accord special dispensation to
AgustaWestland and seek waiver of SQR to make it acceptable for induction?
Technical Oversight
With
a view to have an inbuilt mechanism for checks and balances, DPP mandates that a
Technical
Oversight Committee (TOC) be constituted for all proposals above Rs 300 crores to provide expert oversight over the complete technical evaluation
process – selection of vendors, conduct of trials, compliance of SQR and
identification of technically acceptable vendors. TOC comprises of three members – one service officer, one scientist
from Defence Research and Development Organisation and one representative of Defence
Public Sector Undertakings (preferably not involved with that acquisition). TOC has to give its ruling, based on a majority decision within 30
days.
As per the MoD fact sheet, a TOC was constituted in this case on
06 August 2013 and found the whole technical evaluation process to be in order.
It will be interesting to learn as to whether the TOC report was unanimous or a
majority decision. Members of TOC must be held accountable for overlooking all
infirmities that the CAG report has observed.
Commercial Evaluation
It is rather
intriguing that instead of asking the vendors to extend the validity of their
commercial quotes, as is the standard practice, MoD decided to seek fresh
commercial bids from them. As AgustaWestland was reasonably assured of emerging
as the sole technically acceptable vendor by then, revised bids provided an unwarranted
opportunity to it to defray its overhead costs by inflating the bid.
The process of commercial evaluation is carried out by the
Commercial Negotiation Committee (CNC) under the aegis of MoD. It is headed by
a Joint Secretary level bureaucrat.
As AgustaWestland had emerged as the sole successful vendor, CNC
was required to establish a benchmark and reasonableness of price in an
internal meeting before opening the commercial offer. DPP mandates that if on
opening of the commercial bid, the price quoted by the vendor is found to be
within the benchmark fixed, no price negotiations need be carried out. Criticality
of fixing a realistic benchmarked price can be gauged from the fact that an absurdly
high value can provide windfall gains to a vendor. This is exactly what
happened in the ibid case.
While
submitting the proposal to MoD in January 2006, the Air HQ had estimated the
cost to be Rs 793 crore. Amazingly, in September 2008, CNC pegged the
benchmarked price at Rs 4877.5 crore – more than six times the estimated cost
within a period of less than three years. Astonishingly, cost quoted by the
vendor turned out to be Rs 3966 crore. Thus, the benchmarked cost was higher by
22.80 per cent. The contract
was signed for a negotiated price of Rs 3726.96
crore.
With a view to maintain the sanctity of its ‘single-stage two-bid’ system, DPP
prohibits any change in the configuration of equipment after the issuance of
RFP. Outlandishly, the Air Headquarters demanded inclusion of additional systems
while CNC proceedings were under way. Resultantly, AgustaWestland demanded the
price at will. Responsibility must be fixed for failure to include the
requirement of additional systems while formulating RFP.
Offsets
An offset contract for Rs 1118.09 crore was signed along with
the main contract. The Acquisition Wing and the then Defence Offset
Facilitation Agency were responsible for ensuring scrupulous implementation of
the contract. As per the CAG report, every single provision of the offset
policy has been breached in this deal. Unauthorised programmes were allowed
against offset obligations. Works which had already been completed well before
the signing of the offset contract were allowed to be shown as fresh programmes
to award offset credits and ineligible entities were accepted as Indian offset
partners.
Offsets do not come for free. All vendors include the
anticipated expenses in their quotes. Offset cost penalty can vary between 10
to 15 percent of the value of the main contract. Culpability for slipshod,
inefficient and subjective management of offset programmes that deprived India
of much needed offset benefits must be fixed.
Finally
Paragraph 75 of the DPP empowers the Defence Minister to grant deviations
from the laid down procedure. As observed by CAG, such powers are meant to be invoked
only ‘in exceptional circumstances for certain contingencies or exigencies
which may have arisen subsequent to the issue of RFP’. Therefore, CAG questions
the rationale of making use of these extraordinary powers to grant deviations
on eight counts.
However, the most worrisome is the fact that every deviation
granted was beneficial to the vendors and detrimental to the interests of
India. Acceptance of revised commercial bids, extension of delivery period,
dilution of warranty conditions and reduction in the validity period of the
option clause helped the vendors. It appears some decision makers were more
inclined to favour the vendors rather than safeguarding Indian interests. It is
for MoD to identify them and fix culpability.
Undoubtedly, the contract for
helicopters for VVIPs is an ideal subject for detailed case-study to understand
nature and extent of infirmities that can afflict a major procurement case. It
also demonstrates how a well evolved procurement procedure can be tweaked by knowledgeable
(but insincere) officials.*****