Defence Offsets Proving Detrimental to the Services

Post-Kargil, Indian defence imports had been ranging between 3 to 6 billion dollars annually whereas defence exports had been stagnating at meagre 50 million dollars an year. Despite India’s best efforts very little headway was being made on the export front. As a last resort, a proposal was mooted in 2004 to coerce foreign sellers to compulsorily buy Indian defence goods in exchange. While the proposal was being debated, an article titled “Offsets in Arms Trade: Need for a National Policy” appeared in Indian Defence Review (Oct-Dec 2004). It had suggested that India should have a national offset policy and all major defence deals must carry mandatory offset obligations. Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU) and the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) were quick to grasp the significance of offsets and modified their proposal from one of counter-trade to that of offsets.

As India has no national offset policy, Ministry of Defence (MoD) took the initiative to evolve its own defence offset policy. Initially announced in early 2005, the policy was made a part of Defence Procurement Procedure – 2005. As the primary aim of the policy was to boost exports from the public sector, it allowed discharge of offsets either through FDI in Indian public sector undertaking for defence industrial infrastructure or direct purchase of products/components/services from DPSU/OFB/other industry identified by MoD. Interestingly, the task of monitoring implementation of every offset contract was to be assigned to a DPSU or OFB.

The above policy was subjective in intent. The private sector protested strongly against the unfair treatment meted out to it, forcing MoD to revise the policy in 2006. Scope for direct purchase of defence goods and services was enlarged to include the whole Indian defence industry. It also allowed FDI in Indian defence industry and defence R&D. Further, it defined Indian defence industry to include DPSU, OFB and any private defence industry manufacturing defence products under an industrial licence granted for such manufacture. As no major manufacturing activity was taking place in private sector under licence, the policy continued to favour the public sector.

As was expected, industry associations were not satisfied and appealed to MoD for a level playing field. Bowing to pressure, MoD removed the mandatory requirement of an industrial licence for private companies in 2008. Now, the only stipulation to being an offset partner is that the Indian company should not have more than 26 percent foreign holding.

Before examining the effect of offsets on the services, it is essential to understand three aspects that have a profound bearing on the modernisation plans of the armed forces, i.e. objective of seeking offsets, receipt of technology against offsets and cost of demanding offsets.

Objective of Seeking Offsets

Offsets are universally accepted as a powerful leverage to obtain compensatory benefits by asking the seller to undertake well-designated activities to satisfy vital economic necessity or fill critical technological void. Therefore, before embarking on offsets every country identifies and spells out objectives that are proposed to be achieved through offsets. Thus, the objectives are always nation-specific and in consonance with national aspirations and long-term vision. In the absence of well evolved objectives, offsets lose focus and prove highly wasteful. An aimless offset policy can neither contribute to the growth of indigenous industry nor provide long term economic benefits.

India may be the only country whose defence offset policy has no stated objectives. MoD has not considered it necessary to explain as to what it intends to achieve through offsets and the roadmap for the same. However, as offset policy is a part of Defence Procurement Procedure – 2008 (DPP-2008), it can be reasonably inferred that its objective would be in line with the objective spelt out in DPP-2008, i.e. achieving self-reliance in defence equipment. Additionally, India has been reiterating its resolve to reduce the current proportion of imports from 70 percent to 30 percent. If that be so, primary thrust of the Indian policy should be to seek infusion of technology to strengthen its indigenous defence industrial base.

However, contrary to all rationale, the Indian offset policy has been formulated to continue dependence on imports. India has not considered it necessary to direct offsets to pre-designated areas of its choice. It has abrogated the right to select methodology, areas and offset programmes in favour of the vendors, thereby rendering India’s needs inconsequential. It is natural for every foreign vendor to opt for programmes that cost the least and are easy to fulfill – Indian needs do not count at all.

Infusion of Technology against Offsets

Every country that strives to develop indigenous industry seeks technology through offsets to bridge the gap and use acquired technology as a take off platform for indigenous development of more advanced technologies. More than 35 percent of all offsets worldwide relate to technology transfer. Transfer of technology (ToT) is rightly called as the engine that drives offsets. For technology transfer, all countries adopt a two-step approach, as given below:-

(a) Identification of Critical Technologies. These are technologies that are considered essential for stimulating and expediting the growth of indigenous industrial competence. For economies of scale, sought technologies should not be product-specific but have much wider application across a large range of systems. Ability to absorb identified technology and monitor its transfer is another major consideration.

(b) Persuasion of Vendors to Offer Required Technology. To persuade vendors to part with the technology sought, a system of assigning different multiplier values to various offset programmes is put in place. Multiplier value is a factor applied to the actual value of an offset transaction to calculate the credit value earned. For example, by undertaking an offset programme worth Rs 100 crores with a multiplier value of 3.5, a foreign vendor would earn offset credits equal to Rs 350 crores. By assigning differential weigtage to offset programmes, buyer nations provide sellers with incentives to offer offsets in targeted area of buyer’s choice.

Despite repeated assertions of wanting to make India self-reliant in defence production, India does not accept technology against offsets. This aspect will be dealt with subsequently.

Offsets and Cost Penalty

One of the major misconceptions is that offsets are free add-ons. Nothing can be farther from the truth. Offsets certainly do not come for free as foreign vendors have to incur additional expenditure to fulfill them. There are a number of factors that affect offset overhead costs and it is not feasible to fix an exact yard-stick.

Value of an offset is always expressed in terms of percentage of the value of the main contract. It is generally seen that offsets up to 50 per cent inflate the cost of the main contract by close to 10 per cent. Similarly, 100 and 200 per cent offsets may result in cost escalation by 15 and 20 percent respectively.

The above graph shows the following:-

(a) Cost penalty is not directly proportional to offset percentage. Cost penalty varies with the type of programmes undertaken.

(b) Initial cost of establishing infrastructure and initiating offset programmes is considerable. Once the process becomes functional and gets streamlined, rate of increase in cost penalty drops.

(c) Cost penalty tends to plateau after offset percentage reaches 200 percent. It implies that beyond this stage, both the offset provider and the receiver remain engaged in programmes which make commercial sense to both.

It may come as a surprise to many that the US allows its defence producers to charge offset costs even for government to government Foreign Military Sales (FMS). Although the US Government considers offsets to be detrimental to free and fair trade, it appreciates the need for companies to recover offset costs as they are considerable. The Defence Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) of May 1995, allowed US companies to recover full cost necessary to ‘implement an offset agreement’ in connection with FMS purchases. Subsequently, the scope was widened by using the term ‘offset costs’, thereby facilitating recovery of full expenditure incurred in fulfilling offset obligations. It proves the point that fulfillment of offset obligations costs a company considerable expenditure which it can not absorb and has to recover by factoring it in the sale price.

Offsets and the Indian Services

When the idea of demanding offsets was initially floated in official circles, most service officers thought it to be a harmless appendage to the procurement procedure. Very few were fully aware of its implications. Many welcomed it in the hope that offsets would result in giving an impetus to the Indian defence industry. Being terribly uncomfortable with the continued dependence on foreign vendors and the resultant uncertainties, the services did not grudge encumbrance of offsets in order to make India self-reliant. However, the services were in for a shock. The Indian offset policy is anything but self-reliance centric.

India allows three routes for the fulfillment of offset obligations and they are:-

(a) Direct purchase of or executing export orders for defence products or services provided by Indian defence industries. For the purpose of defence offsets, services mean maintenance, overhaul, upgradation, life extension, engineering, design, testing of defence products, defence related software or quality assurance services.

(b) FDI in Indian defence industries for industrial infrastructure for services, co-development, joint ventures and co-production of defence products and components.

(c) FDI in Indian organisations engaged in research in defence R & D.

An examination of the viability of the above three routes is very revealing. At the face of it FDI route appears highly viable but when considered in the light of upper cap of 26 percent, the dissuasiveness of the policy becomes apparent. A foreign investor is expected to invest his resources in a venture where he has no significant control, strict capacity/product constraints, no purchase guarantee and no open access to other markets including exports. The FDI policy was announced in May 2001 and has elicited no response. Therefore, options (b) and (c) above mean little.

Export of defence goods and services is thus the only possible method to fulfill offset obligations under the Indian policy. It amounts to compensation trading which is considered to be the least beneficial form of offsets. Export of goods and services provide temporary and illusory gains, as has been the experience the world over. New markets dry up soon after the offsets are fulfilled, leaving created infra-structure idle and bereft of orders. Therefore, such trading does nothing to either strengthen the defence industrial base or promote technology upgradation. In other words, a potent tool like offsets is wasted on one-time exports.

Undoubtedly, the services have been taken for a ride. Offsets have added to their disquiet and anxieties without any boost to indigenous defence industry. A look at the following major concerns of the services will reveal the intensity and magnitude of the dilemma faced by them:-

(a) Offsets impose a cost penalty on all procurements that carry offset obligation clauses. This implies that the outflow from the defence budget gets proportionately increased. For example, for a deal that mandates 50 percent offsets, the defence budget will have to pay up to 10 percent extra in costs.

(b) Simultaneous signing of offset contract can result in a loss of focus, away from the main contract. DPP-2008 lays down that at every stage of evaluation, offset proposals would be examined along with the main technical and commercial proposals to confirm compliance. A competent vendor may get eliminated by default if his offset proposal is found unsatisfactory.

(c) Offset obligations have to be fulfilled co-terminus with the main contract. The policy allows imposition of penalty and its recovery by way of deduction from the bank guarantee of the main contract or the amount payable to the vendor under the main contract. Further, failure to implement full offset obligations during the period of the main contract makes the vendor liable to be disqualified for participation in future defence contracts. With such punitive provisions in place, any default in offset programmes can delay the main contract and even jeopardise it.

(d) Offsets are notorious for corruption as they are often formulated in broad and imprecise terms, leaving enough leeway for multiple interpretations and manipulations. Furthermore, offset contracts are never monitored as closely as the main contract. Allegations of malpractice in offsets can put a foreign vendor under cloud and affect his commitment to timely completion of the main contract. Additionally, MoD may be forced to debar the vendor to exhibit its zero tolerance for dishonest activities, thereby endangering the main contract as well.

Indian Services are the Net Losers

As per the figures released by Defence Offset Facilitation Agency (DOFA), offset agreements worth Rs 8125 crores had been signed by the end of 2009. The share of aero systems is 94 percent at Rs 7645 crores and that of naval systems 6 percent at Rs 480 crores. While bulk of the export orders have gone to the public sector (mostly HAL Ltd), some orders have been placed on the private sector companies for the supply of goods and services.

To generate offset contracts worth Rs 8125 crores, the value of main contracts would be close to Rs 17000 crores (assuming offset percentage to be mere 30 percent). Again, considering the standard cost penalty of 10 percent, the Indian defence budget has already suffered an extra outflow of close to Rs 1550 crores on account of offsets – only to facilitate export orders of sundry items for some select Indian companies. It will not be incorrect to state that the Indian offset policy is designed to obtain export orders for the public sector at the cost of the defence budget. Take the case of 126 fighter aircraft that India proposes to buy at an indicative cost of 11 billion dollars. The proposal carries an offset liability of 50 percent, resulting in a likely cost penalty of 10 percent. It implies that India could save one billion dollars if no offset obligations are imposed or buy up to 15 additional aircraft with the same budget. It is certain that extra outflow of one billion dollars will finance export orders for HAL. Worse, HAL would manufacture and supply low-tech items like doors and windows of aircraft and not systems/sub-systems that may boost its technological prowess.

On the whole, offsets are not contributing to the upgradation of indigenous technological base but adding to the woes of the services and taxing the defence budget. Indian policy makers have failed to appreciate the full potential of offsets and trivialised a powerful instrument of industrial growth for transitory gains for DPSU and other entities.

The Way Forward

As seen above, offsets cost a country considerable extra expenditure. The question therefore arises whether they are desirable. It is universally accepted that offsets make sound business sense only if the trade-off results in extraordinary economic or technological gains. Technologies that industrially-advanced countries are reluctant to sell can only be obtained through the leverage of offsets. Over 130 nations are demanding offsets in defence purchases today. Despite knowing that the seller is bound to amortise the offset expenditure by suitably factoring it in his price quote, the countries find the proposition appealing.

India has an unusual knack of inserting provisions in a policy that are totally contrary to the stated objectives of the policy itself. Self reliance is a stated aim of DPP-2008. Yet, India does not accept technology under offsets. It is a dichotomy that the services fail to understand. The common reason given by the Government functionaries is that they are unable to price technology. It is a totally specious and hollow excuse. India purchases technology as a part of ‘Buy and Make’ deals – either contracted as a part of the main deal itself or negotiated separately at a later stage. Apparently, no ToT contract can be entered into without pricing the technology involved.

There is no standard price of technology in the world market. It is purely need-based and determined by the degree of desperation of the technology seeker. DRDO can be asked to identify technologies that it needs. Normally, DRDO should seek technologies in which it has made considerable headway but not mastered – commonly referred to as lacking ‘last mile connectivity’. Thereafter, DRDO can work out the anticipated expenditure on indigenous effort to master the said technology as also urgency of its application. These two factors help decide fair, reasonable and acceptable price of technology.

Many knowledgeable observers are of the opinion that MoD has been pressurised by the public sector to disallow ToT against offsets as the public sector wants to perpetuate its monopoly on receipted technology through the current system of ‘Buy and Make’ deals. The public sector fears that acceptance of ToT against offsets would make the private sector preferred partner of foreign vendors. Therefore, opposition of the public sector is purely to safeguard its exclusive turf. It is time MoD rises above extraneous considerations to ensure that the benefits accruing from offsets do not get outweighed by the cost penalty. Transfer of technology should be made the preferred form of offsets. Through a well-evolved system of application of multipliers, irresistible incentives should be provided to foreign vendors to offer technologies that India needs the most.

Women in the Armed Forces: Misconceptions and Facts

The recent debate about the induction of women in the armed forces has been highly skewed and shallow. An issue that critically affects the fighting potential of the armed forces has been reduced to ‘equality of sexes’ and ‘women’s liberation’. Many ill-informed observers have trifled such a sensitive matter by terming it as ‘conquering the last male bastion’. Sadly, stances have been taken more on the basis of personal views and mind-sets rather than on well evolved logic. Both military and non-military experts are equally guilty in this regard.

In the recent past, the nation was shocked to hear a retired senior Army officer recommending constitution of all women battalions in the Indian Army. There cannot be a more preposterous and perilous proposition. It is equally common to hear the argument that if the Naxalites and LTTE can have women fighters, why the Indian armed forces should be reluctant to do so. Often people quote the number of American women fighting war in Iraq and Afghanistan to question India’s stance against allowing women in combat. This article endeavours to remove some common misconceptions and put all issues in their proper perspective.

To start with, it needs to be stressed that the services carry no male chauvinistic mindset. The very fact that daughters of service officers have excelled in all fields proves that service officers do not suffer from any gender bias and are very supportive of women’s advancement. However, the issue of women’s induction in the services warrants singular treatment.

It will be instructive to take a look at the genesis of the issue. Earlier, entry of women was limited to the Army Medical Corps, the Army Dental Corps and the Military Nursing Service. In the early 90s, a service Chief visited the United States and saw women participating in Guards of Honour. He was suitably impressed and wondered why India should lag behind in this aspect. Thus the decision to induct women was neither need-based nor well thought-through. The first batch of women Short Service Commission (SSC) officers joined in 1992. No attempt was made to study likely long term implications of multiple issues involved and their effect on the fighting potential of the services. In other words, a decision of colossal significance was taken in a totally cavalier, slapdash and hasty manner. As the other two services did not want to be seen as ‘male-chauvinists’, they followed suit. Soon a race got underway between the three services to induct women in maximum number of fields. It is only now that a plethora of complex issues are getting thrown up with resultant adverse fall-out.

Presently, the Indian Army counts 2.44 percent women in its ranks, the Indian Navy 3.0 percent and the Indian Air Force 6.7 percent. The tenure of women SSC officers has since been increased to 14 years. The Government has also approved grant of Permanent Commission to SSC (Women) officers prospectively in Judge Advocate General (JAG) Department and Army Education Corps (AEC) of Army and their corresponding Branch/Cadre in Navy and Air Force, Accounts Branch of the Air Force and Corps of Naval Constructors of the Navy.

Common Misconceptions and Facts

• Women must get equal opportunities in the services

The concept of equality of sexes is unquestionable. Its application should, however, never affect the fighting potential of the armed forces. Two points need to be highlighted here. First, the armed forces are constituted for national defence and there can be no compromise on that issue. Secondly, the armed forces are not a ‘Rozgar Yojana’ to provide employment to all segments of the society in equal proportion. As it is a question of nation’s defence, the best man or woman should be selected for every job. In other words, women should be inducted in the services only if they add value or at least not affect it adversely. No right thinking individual can advocate women’s induction at the cost of the fighting potential. That would be disastrous for the country.

Interestingly, demand for equal opportunities is selective in nature. Women want to join only as officers and not as soldiers. Additionally, the concept of equality is given a go-by soon after commissioning. Applications for peace postings and other special dispensations proliferate. They join the military on the plank of equality of sexes but this plank vanishes the day they join the training academy. Thereafter, they again become the weaker sex needing special privileges.

• Women can perform all physical tasks as well as men

Standards of physical fitness of women can never be the same as those of men. It is a biological reality and is true for all fields including sports. In the case of women officers, Indian army has lowered the standards to appallingly low levels. Even then many women fail to qualify during their pre-commission training. Whereas male cadets are required to run 5 km in 28 minutes, women are given 40 minutes. Similarly, males are required to jump across a 9 feet wide ditch with full equipment and personal weapon; women have to negotiate only a 5 feet wide ditch. Worse, most women fail in the test.

All male officers and soldiers are subjected to annual Battle Physical Efficiency Tests till they attain the age of 45 years. No such tests have been prescribed for women officers to avoid embarrassment to them in front of the troops. Concerns have also been expressed about the susceptibility of Indian women to frequent back problems, pelvic injuries and stress fractures.

A recent review conducted by the British army concluded that women have neither the upper-body strength nor the physical resilience to withstand intensive combat. Tests in 2000 respondents found that women were eight times more likely than men to sustain injuries other than wounds in action.

• Physical fitness is of lesser importance in modern fighting

Need for physical effort is dictated by two factors - level of technological development and nature of military’s involvement. Requirement for physical prowess undoubtedly reduces as the armies advance technologically. In other words, quantum of physical effort needed is inversely proportional to technological progression. Thus, as an army evolves technologically, more high-tech jobs get generated where technically qualified women can be gainfully employed. In a high-tech army like the US, a woman sitting in the US mainland can effectively guide drone attacks in Afghanistan. India on the other hand is still a second generation technology force which is trying desperately to graduate to the third generation. Indian defence forces are man-power intensive needing physical ground effort. India has very few high-tech jobs.

As regards degree and extent of a military’s involvement in active combat duties, countries like Canada and Australia face no internal or external threat and their militaries are generally in peacetime mode with routine passive duties. They can certainly afford to have a larger percentage of women in their forces. Contrast this with India where the majority of Army troops are deployed on active combat duties in remote, inhospitable and uncongenial areas. Only physically fit and tough troops can survive. Worse, peace tenures are short and there are very few periods of comparative lull.

Therefore, the Indian services continue to be physical-power intensive and will remain so in the near future. Only the very fit can survive to deliver in India’s hostile environment.

• The US has deployed a large number of women soldiers for fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan

Although a large number of women have been deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, their employment has been confined to support functions. Although till the end of 2009, the US and allies had suffered a total of 4689 casualties, there has not been a single woman war casualty. Similarly, despite the fact that the US and allies have suffered 1555 casualties, not a single woman has lost her life in the Afghanistan war so far. Many people tend to confuse casualties due to hostile action with combat casualties. The US has lost 19 female servicemen in Iraq to hostile activities like car bombs, IED blasts and helicopter crashes since the beginning of 2007, but there has been no combat casualty. It is simply because of the fact no women are deployed in combat duties. As a matter of fact, they are forbidden to be placed in direct ground combat with enemy. They generally perform medical, intelligence, logistic and traffic control duties. Women are thus kept sheltered in safe appointments, away from the risk of capture by the adversary.

Even in Israel which has conscription for women (as well as men), women are not allotted active battle field duties. They serve in technical, administrative and training posts to release men for active duty.

• If BSF can have an all women battalion to guard border, why not the Indian Army

The Border Security Force (BSF) has certainly raised an all women battalion and deployed it on the international border. However, the following important facts need to be highlighted:-

• The battalion is led by male officers and subordinate functionaries.
• The battalion has not been positioned on the Line of Control where firing and infiltration attempts are frequent. Instead, it has been deployed near Ferozepur on the International Border (IB) which is totally peaceful and where Indian and Pak troops routinely exchange sweets on festivals.
• Even on IB no independent sector has been entrusted to the women battalion. It has been superimposed on an existing male battalion. Importantly, women perform no night guard duties – these are performed by males.

Earlier, village women were not allowed to go across the border fence to cultivate their fields as no women sentries were available to frisk them. It was a sore point with the border folks. The sole purpose of raising the women battalion is to redress this long standing grievance. Their task is akin to what CISF women have been carrying out at the airports for long – frisking of women. Therefore, it will be incorrect to call the BSF battalion a fighting force.

• Women officers help overcome the shortage of officers in the forces

It is an erroneous impression that there is a shortage of male volunteers for the services. As per the report of the Union Public Service Commission for 2006-07, there were a total of 5,49,365 candidates for 1724 vacancies for all civil services examinations with an Applicants to Post Ratio (APR) of 319. On the other hand, 3,41,818 candidates applied for 793 vacancies in the National Defence Academy (NDA), maintaining APR at a healthy 431. It implies that for every seat in NDA there were 431 applicants. Therefore, it is a fallacy that male volunteers are insufficient. It is just that the services seek very exacting standards for males while women are accepted with abysmally low standards.

• Short service commission for women has proved highly productive

As a matter of fact, short service commission (normally extended to 10 years) has proved to be a totally wasteful and counter-productive exercise. Women normally get commissioned at the age of 23 to 25 years. Within two to three years of their commission, they get married, mostly to colleague male officers. Soon thereafter they start applying for peace postings on compassionate grounds to be with their husbands. Every pregnancy means three years’ exemption from physical activities – one year pre-natal and two years post-delivery. With the standard two-child norm, a women officer remains physically inactive for close to six years. It implies that after the first post-commission tenure, a woman officer is rarely in a position to participate in field exercises and has to be exempted all out-door work. Thus the services gain little.

In an informal interaction, a senior Junior Commissioned Officer (JCO) questioned the rationale of granting SSC to women. “In the case of men, 25 to 35 years age span is most productive and grant of SSC is understandable. On the other hand, women have to raise their families during that period. By granting SSC to women, we have achieved nothing except increase the load on maternity wards of military hospitals,” he opined.

• If women can fight as soldiers in LTTE and Naxalite outfits, why not in the services

Comparing irregular outfits with constitutionally created regular forces shows speciousness of the logic. In any case, even LTTE recruited women only after it fell short of male volunteers. Moreover, women held no high appointments and were generally used as pawns in indoctrinated suicide squads. If one was to carry the comparison forward, LTTE had recruited boys of 15 years to take up arms and act as human bombs. A lawfully structured formal organisation cannot be expected to follow suit.

• Indian women officers have proved themselves and established their credibility as leaders

Not withstanding the public posturing of the services top brass, the experience so far has been highly discouraging. Superior male officers admire their enthusiasm despite the environmental difficulties, but are faced with the twin problems of their safety and useful employment. Additionally, as many duties (like night duty officer) cannot be assigned to women, male officers have to be given additional work load, which they resent. There are also concerns, based on Israeli studies, that soldiers first instinct may be to defend the women in their ranks rather than to fight the enemy.

Male officers also question the logic of having women only as officer. Indian officers pride themselves in the fact that they lead from the front and hence have to be better than their soldiers both physically and professionally. But, by having women only in the officer cadre an impression gets conveyed to the environment that officers’ duties are softer and can be carried out by women as well, thereby lowering their standing.

As per an informal survey carried out, 81 percent of the troops were convinced that women officers could never lead them in war efficiently. The balance 19 percent were unsure of their response. Acceptability of women as leaders was thus very poor. Another segment of respondents viewed the whole issue as a political gimmick which did not warrant serious attention. “How can the Government be naïve enough to think that a leader who cannot run, train and exercise with troops and lacks required physical fitness can lead them in war?” they query.

• Women in Western forces are well accepted and adjusted

It is a fallacy. Acceptance of women in the military has not been smooth in any country. Despite efforts made to sensitise the environment, they continue to be confronted with social, behavioural and psychological problems at all levels. To date most countries do not allow women tank crews because of the cramped conditions and lack of privacy. There are also concerns about cramped living conditions on board submarines and dangers posed by fumes inside the submarine to a foetus if a woman becomes pregnant.

Sexual harassment and assaults of women soldiers is known to be blatant and quite prevalent in the US forces. A sexual harassment hotline set up at Aberdeen received 6,825 calls from women from all branches of the military in just two months. Hundreds of women are said to have complained of sexual assault in the forces since the beginning of Iraq war in 2003. Level of moral degradation can be gauged from the fact that ‘command rape’ has come to be accepted as a common phenomenon in the military - a superior official, under the might of his command authority, can force a subordinate woman soldier to accede to his sexual demands.
A joint survey carried out in 2006 in the UK by the Ministry of Defence and the Equal Opportunities Commission found that 67% of the respondents had experienced sexualised behaviour directed at them personally in the previous 12 months. Worse, over half of those who made a formal complaint stated that there had been negative consequences as a result of which 64% were considering leaving the services.
On the other hand, Indian armed forces can be rightfully proud of their record which is far better than that of any advanced nation in the world. Women are treated in a manner befitting their dignity and their safety is ensured.

India Needs to Exercise Caution

It is universally accepted that induction of women in the services should be dictated by the level of technology, prevailing security environment and the nature of likely deployment. Availability of adequate number of male volunteers is another major consideration.

India should follow a graduated approach. Women’s expertise, talent and competence should be profitably utilised in areas which are totally non-combat in nature. For the present, women must continue to play their established role in the medical, dental and nursing services, both as short service and permanent commission officers. However, they should not be granted short service commission in any other branch. The Government has rightly approved grant of permanent commission to women in legal and education departments of the three services, accounts branch of the Air Force and constructors of the Navy. Grant of permanent commission should also be considered for women in Survey of India, Military Engineering Service Militarised Cadre and Director General Quality Assurance.

The current policy of non-induction of women in combat arms should continue. Additionally, their entry into Engineers, Signals, Supply Corps, Ordnance and EME (Electrical and Mechanical Engineers) should be deferred till infusion of technology generates adequate number of high-tech jobs.

Finally, it should never be forgotten that the raison d'être for the constitution of the armed forces is to ensure security of the country. Decisions which have a far reaching effect on the defence potential of the armed forces must be taken with due diligence. Instead of replicating a model, India must chart its own policy. It has an experience of 18 years. Honest feedback must be sought to appreciate the true ground situation and initiate corrective measures. Most importantly, the military brass must show moral courage to admit that the present mess demands a holistic review of the policy, protestations of self-styled champions of gender-parity not withstanding. Decisions taken as a matter of political and populist expediency can prove disastrous for the nation in the long run. Defence matters cannot be treated as publicity gimmick to flaunt sexual equality.